The International Commission on Nobility and Royalty
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PLUS:
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SOVEREIGNTY: Questions and Answers
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Introduction
". . . Sovereignty is the immediate jewel of a nation. . . . [It is not only] the great vital right of a state [, it is its glory and independence --- the most precious thing it has]." (Elihu Burritt, Thoughts and Notes at Home and Abroad, 1868, p. 266) "Westphalia [the beginning of a codification of the greatest secular right on earth] remains the most significant revolution in sovereignty to date." (Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 2002, p. 32) "Make no mistake about it. In international law, sovereignty is of paramount importance and is the ultimate question in determining the survival of a nation." (http://legalstatusrus.com/Legal_Status.htm) Since 1648, Westphalia or absolute sovereignty of states has spread to all the world.
"Westphalia [is] a benchmark, a standard. . . ." (Ibid.) "Sovereignty is one of the foremost [most important] institutions of our world: it virtually defines the modern era and sets it apart from previous eras" (Robert Jackson, Sovereignty at the Millennium, 1999, p. 9) "It is part of the very 'grammar' of modern politics." (op.cit.) As A. P. dEnteves put it, "The importance [or greatness] of the doctrine of sovereignty can hardly be overrated." (National Law, 1970, p. 67) It is the "cornerstone" of interntional law. "The principle essentially maintains . . . [that] there is one supreme authority, the sovereign, who exercises political power that is perpetual, inalienable, indivisible, and absolute over all members of that community [nation, principality or kingdom]." Luc B. Tremblay, The Rule of Law, Justice, and Interpretation, 1997, p. 199)
Hardly anything can match it. It is so important and crucial, because it is the bedrock principle of all true monarchy, nobility, royalty and chivalry; and since some people have made objections about this right, these questions and challenges need to be addressed one by one --- not by repeating the vast amount of evidence and proof already supplied in the long and detailed article “ Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty” and the article " Dynastic Law," but to answer questions and hopefully provide some new and additional evidence and points worth bringing up. After all, the future of nobility, royalty and chivalry is in the balance, so much of what we consider important is at stake.
Before we start, two terms, that will be used over and over again, must be defined:
1. " De jure" means " legal," " legitimate," " by right," " lawful," " as a matter of law" " constitutional" or " in principle," but not in practice, " just," " rightful," " morally and ethically right," " rightful entitlement or claim."
2. "Defacto" means existing "in fact," "actually," "in reality," "in power," "in practice," "operating," but not necessarily legally, rightfully or legitimately.
" A de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state. . . . A de facto government is in actual possession of authority and in control of the state." ( www.answers.com/topic/de-jure) A " defacto" government can also be one which has seized power by force or in any other illegal manner and governs in spite of the existence of a " de jure" or rightful government. This is the situation that we will be addressing and discussing in the following. That is, the monarch, or legitimate government in exile, has been robbed and plundered of the right to rule. In the case of a deposed monarch, his rights, and those of his successors, have been violated and wronged by an the unlawful act of theft whether by referendum, a conquest or a coup. The following article on sovereignty will show how these deposed monarchs, and their successors and heirs, are still lawful, rightful and legitimate if they maintain these rights.
Sovereignty is inalienable and inviolable. It doesn't matter if the world recognizes the usurper as a sovereign government or not, the rightful, genuine and authentic sovereignty of a king, sovereign prince, or government-in-exile, remains intact even though they no longer have control over their former territories. Their "right" to sovereignty cannot be destroyed unless the deposed king or sovereign prince, or their rightful successors, willingly, and without duress, either renounces, cedes, abandons, acquiescences or gives up his or her royal right to rule either tacitly or by implication. In other words, if the "de jure" sovereign, and his successors, continue to use their titles, they are safe and retain the full honor and glory of their former kingdoms on a never ending basis. This will be explained below. But the point is, because "inviolability" is defined as "invincible" and "indestructible," which means it cannot be defeated or overcome without consent, then, "The principle of the inviolability of sovereignty means that the occupying power may obtain de facto sovereignty, but the ousted sovereign [the deposed monarch] retains it de jure;" and he retains it forever as long as he or his heirs never give up, but maintain their rights throughout their generations forever. (Karen Guttieri, "Making Might Right: The Legitimization of Occupation," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17, 2004: www.allacademic.com/meta/p73837_index.html)
Sovereignty is the cornerstone, the rock hard foundation of civilized society. However, as Lassa Oppenheim, considered an authority on international law, declared:
There exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty)
"The difficulties encountered at the international level start with the interpretation of concepts that have been left undefined and vague." (Kaarle Nordenstreng & Herbert I. Schiller, National Sovereignty and International Communication, 1979, p. 162) As a result or, "In the absence of even a . . . formal definition, it should be no surprise that interpretations can often be no more than "subjective. . . ." (Ibid.) "At this point must be distinguished several uses of the term "sovereignty," the interchanging of which often led to serious confusion, and gave rise to not a little of the current difference of opinion." (Charles Edward Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, 1900, p. 122) For example, national sovereignty can be the equivalent of state sovereignty or it can refer to internal national sovereignty or external national sovereignty, which are two different things making conversation and scholarly or political discourse puzzling and difficult to follow. This confusion can lead to unfounded conclusions and misunderstandings and give open reign for the enemies of sovereignty to cloud the issues even further. The following quote explains where the problem lies, as will be elaborated in the first "question and answer" given below, "The lack of clarity on this point is . . . due to the confusion between the sovereignty of international law and the sovereignty of the state." (The American Journal of International Law, vol. 38, 1944, p. 119) This is an extremely important concept without which the sovereignty of deposed monarchs will not be understood. Hence, the value of reading this article in full.
If you have a question, or any comments, to make on sovereignty, or on anything else on this page, please use the e-mail contact form below and let us know. Our articles have been greatly strengthened, improved, refined and enlarged, because of the useful feedback we have received including two notable international law experts.
Click on the question or statement that interests you:
Questions and Answers
(1) Sovereignty is accused of being confusing and to have changed or been modified in meaning over the years. Are you saying it is still relevant to deposed monarchs and governments in exile in our day and time?
The short answer is yes. Throughout all history ". . . the basic elements [of sovereignty] remain constant. . . . Those premises have remained unchanged [consistent and stable] down to the present day." (op.cit., Jeremy Rabkin, p. 22) That is, "What is stable and continuous over the entire history of sovereignty is the idea that a sovereign government is an authority that is supreme over all other authorities in the same territorial jurisdiction, and is independent of all foreign authorities." (Ibid., p. 23) Sovereignty ". . . retains vitality in international use, and remains the cornerstone [or rock solid fundamental concept] of international law." (Philip M. Nichols, “Integrated Sovereignty,” 2008 Seminar Lecture: http://works.bepress
.com/cgi/viewcontent .cgi?article =1002&context=philip_nichols)
Sovereignty is important. It has had important consequences for millions in the past and now billions of ordinary people in the present and in the future. It has to be jealously guarded, yet it is persistently attacked by political actors, who are not sovereign, but want to be. This includes revolutionaries, globalists, nationalists, populists, European Unionists and secessionists among others. Those who say "Westphalian sovereignty is a myth" or hypocrisy fail to see clearly the reality that sovereignty is "no more a myth than the ideas of the rule of law, the social contract, democracy, [etc.]. [But sovereignty like other abstract concepts] has been a key [or a bedrock] ingredient in the foundation . . . of the modern system of rule." (Giovanni Arrighi, "Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the 'Endless' Accumulation of Capital," 1977: http://fbc.binghampton.edu/gairvn97.htm) Even:
The reshaping of sovereignty by human rights has left states today no less sovereign than they were fifty, a hundred, or three hundred and fifty years ago. Contemporary human rights constraints on the freedom of action of states are completely compatible with "full" "Westphalian" sovereignty. Rather than 1948 [the Universal Declaration of Human Rights] challenging, let alone triumphing over, 1648 [the Peace of Westphalia], the society of states has made space for human rights within the practices of state sovereignty." (op.cit., Jack Donnelly)
"At the core [the center or hub of the word sovereignty] . . . is the idea of supreme authority." (Ibid.) Robert Jackson, professor of International Relations and Political Science at Boston University, explains:
A sovereign state can be defined as an authority that is supreme in relation to all other authorities in the same territorial jurisdiction, and that is independent of all foreign [or outside] authorities. . . .
That definition can apply to a republic just as readily as a monarchy. . . .
There are not different kinds of sovereignty. A sovereign state is not a particular form of constitution, such as a monarchy or republic or democracy. Nor is it a particular style of governance. Sovereignty is a political and legal foundation upon which various sorts of state[s] . . . can be erected, and styles of government carried on. If states are sovereign, their ruling authority will have the same basic characteristics of supremacy and independency no matter how they are otherwise constitution or governed. ( Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 1988, pp. 10-11)
What has caused a lot of confusion is the difference between internal and external sovereignty. " Internally, sovereignty can be generally defined with little controversy as the ability to have supreme authority within a defined territory. . . ." (Turki Althunayan, Dealing with the Fragmented International Legal Environment, 2010, p. 97) There is no problem with this. It is definitive, clear and universally accepted. Where problems come is when we are discussing external, as opposed to internal sovereignty, because " Externally, no single meaning of sovereignty exists. . . ." (Ibid.) Without a proper definition, we can be having an apples and oranges problem, instead of the talking about the same identical thing. " One [big] reason why there is no consensus as to a single definition is that there is no international authority which has undertaken the task of identifying an acceptable and accurate definition." (Ibid.) Hence, the reason why there is an accusation about changes in definition is because external sovereignty is ill defined. But there is no confusion about " de jure" internal sovereignty --- the sovereignty of both reigning constitutional monarchs and deposed kings or legitimate governments in exile. Internal "s overeignty . . . has a core [essential or deep rooted] meaning, supreme authority within a territory.” ( Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised 2009: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty) Scholars, politicians and others with hidden agendas, have attacked it and purposely confused it with external sovereignty, but, the test of time has shown that the general principle of sovereignty is robust, strong and flexible. And internal sovereignty has survived with its well-defined and precise core intact and undamaged. (See: Questions #5 and #18)
Because the definition of external sovereignty is so fluid and ambiguous, internal sovereignty has become the best known aspect of sovereignty, because it is clear and understandable. But it is often confused with the external, which creates communication problems that muddies the water, misleads and mystifies such an important subject. Remember, "External sovereignty of the state is what international lawyers [usually or most often] have in mind when they speak of sovereignty. . . ." (Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 2001, p. 18)
Internal sovereignty is the most important dimension of sovereignty. It boils down to the fact that, a nation or state can exist without external sovereignty; that is, without outside recognition, but it would fail without internal sovereignty or the defacto control of the people. Deposed monarchs, and authentic governments in exile, lawfully hold the internal right to rule their nations or territories even though they have been denied the ability to actually govern by their usurpers --- the defacto regimes.
(2) What is dynastic law and sovereignty?
Dynastic sovereignty is nothing more or less than the supreme power being vested in the king or sovereign prince and his successors. It is the personification and embodiment of all the power, majesty and glory of the nation and is an " . . . inalienable right of sovereignty, . . . which can be lost only by voluntary [willing or implied] renunciation (transfer) or [the] extinction of the dynasty [or royal family itself]." (Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law, 1998, p. 54) This is " de jure internal sovereignty," and it can last forever and never end; or it can be irretrievably and permanently lost. Much of the " questions and answers" in this article directly support and relate to it. It describes the sovereign rights of both reigning and deposed monarchs and their successors. For more on this special quality, see the articles: " Dynastic Law," " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty," and " Sovereignty in the Holy Roman and Byzantine Empires."
Dynastic law, on the other hand, is the personal and private rules of a royal house that govern eligibility to a throne as well as determining membership and the entitlement to honors, ranks, titles and styles. It may be codified and be part of a constitution or statute or it may merely be an oral tradition. Both reigning and "de jure" royal houses have basic house rules that may change as decided upon by the Head of Royal House.
(3) Isn't it true that there is a legal impasse that puts “on hold” all rightful claims of deposed monarchs and governments in exile until a competent world court with proper jurisdiction is established?
Wrongfully deposed monarchs and legitimate governments in exile are unjustly denied the right to bring their grievances to any court on earth --- only recognized nations can participate in international tribunals. Louis A. M. Mendola, who has written a number of articles on heraldry, chivalry and royalty, declared, " . . . The underlying issue here is that in international law non-regnant royal families are sovereign de jure and therefore no juridical authority is empowered to settle [their] . . . dispute[s]." (" In Defence of (Real) History:" 2009: www.regalis.com/2sicilieshead.htm) Because, “ Only states are subjects of international law, the bearers of international legal obligations and powers.” (Evgeny Pashukanis, " Selected Writings on Marxism and Law," P. Beirne & R. Sharlet, editors, 1980, pp.168-83, 184-5) Therefore, “ In the international court of justice, only governments have standing.” (Justice Richard J. Goldstone, " What We have Learned," Dilemmas of Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts, Carol Anne Leuchs Prager & Trudy Govier, editors, 2003, p. 344) The problem with domestic and municipal courts is a matter of incompetent jurisdiction. Therefore, " de jure" claimants cannot ". . . transfer their quarrels to the area of the jurisdiction of its municipal Courts.” (G. J. M., " International Law. Recognition De Facto. Requisition of Ship by Both De Jure and De Facto Government," The Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 2, 1940, p. 271) There are, in fact, no courts to take these cases, except perhaps in Italy where pretenders used to be prosecuted. (See Questions #19 and #20) Deposed monarchs are left completely out of having any forum to protect, safeguard or reclaim theirs rights.
And even if they could go to an international court, these courts are voluntary, that is, " . . . international law is dependent upon the voluntary participation of states in its formulation, observance, and enforcement." (Nelson Dordelly-Rosales, "State Sovereignty and the Protection of Human Rights," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, May 27, 2008: www.allacademic.com/meta/p235808_index.html) International law is " agreement law." It " . . . is binding only because it is agreed to." (Steven Lee, " A Puzzle of Sovereignty:" www.bu.edu/wep/Papers/Poli/PoliLee.htm) The “defacto” or usurping government, in power and possession of the nation and its resources, could simply ignore the Court or any decision they made.
No court, in the here and now, is likely to ever take on a " de jure" royal or imperial case involving the right to rule. Over 99% of modern laws, conventions and courts, etc. are completely irrelevant or lack competence when it comes to “ de jure” claims of ousted governments. In addition, there is a powerful bias against former monarch's rights to the throne, which is extremely formidable and acts as a gigantic deterrent. So what is left? --- international law and philosophy, which is a mixture of the words of scholars, jurists, treaties, court decisions and relevant historical practices. The past, where monarchs ruled and dominated practically all countries, is fertile ground for the principles that are most suited to enlighten us on what is authentic and genuine. Modern conventions still support these same fundamental principles of fairness and justice. For example:
Protests [which will be explained in questions 6 through 12] are sufficient to avoid prescription [the total loss of all sovereign and royal rights] and there is no requirement [in international law] to refer [this kind of] a dispute to international tribunals or other settlement mechanisms. (Jessup worldwide Competition for International Law, "Bench Memorandum 2010," p. 12)
We are, as explained on our " Home Page," a private, non-government organization, similar to a number of others organization that also function to promote the ideals of constitutional monarchy, nobility, royalty and chivalry. We act in a capacity similar to an accrediting association. Just as an educational accrediting association would not accredit a " diploma mill," we will not certify as authentic something that is merely fantasy or make believe, nor do we give credibility to unproven or unprovable claims, or anything else not based on correct principles.
(4) The public thinks you are basing everything you do on solid legal ground when you are really basing your decisions on legal philosophy. The sayings of the ancients are not immutable or enforceable.
Very good observation. We have built our judgments and standards on the systems of law created when monarchy and nobility ruled the earth. They are from ancient times, but were more particularly articulated in the 14th to the 19th centuries. But the rules we use regarding sovereignty have been incorporated into modern international sovereignty law and are therefore still applicable and binding.
However, the principles of justice and law in regard to " de jure" (or deposed) monarchs, or their successors, are not enforceable, because international courts do not allow such cases to be tried. (See question #3) Only nations can participate in the International Court of Justice or Tribunals. Therefore, all we can do is give our opinions based upon the standards of known principles of what is just and lawfully right. The fact is that some of the most important principles we espouse, although recognized in international law, are recognized only in “ breach” or in an inactive or dormant manner. That is, no " de jure" (or deposed) governments, such as, a legitimate government-in-exile or monarch are officially recognized. Nevertheless, in effect, the laws are still on the books. For example, it is recognized in international law that a government-in-exile has the following powers:
. . . undertake many types of actions in the conduct of their daily affairs. These actions include:
becoming a party to a bilateral or international treaty
amending or revising its own constitution
maintaining military forces
retaining (or "newly obtaining") diplomatic recognition by sovereign states
issuing identity cards
allowing the formation of new political parties
instituting democratic reforms
holding elections
Yet, no nation on earth will recognize or validate as " de jure" and rightful any of them, even though some of these organizations, like the exiled government of the Dalai Lama of Tibet, has great respect and influence world wide. Nor will the world officially respect or acknowledge the authentic and genuine rights of deposed monarchs and their rightful successors. The problem is, " . . . who is [externally] sovereign, de jure or defacto, of a territory [internationally] is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which is by the legislative and executive departments. . . ." (Anthony J. Colangelo, " De facto Sovereignty: Boumediene and Beyond," The George Washington Law Review, vol. 77, no. 623, April 2009, p. 638) Being a political question, what is ethical is rarely considered, but what is popular at the time is what is important when it comes to politics. That is, recognition becomes a matter of whim or expediency. It is not usually a matter of what is right, just or true. The rule of law is thus subverted and contaminated by the capriciousness and notoriously corrupt decisions of politicians. For example, President Richard Nixon for political reasons granted Chairman Mao and Red China " de jure" recognition or legitimization even though this corrupt and wretched man killed or slaughtered 80,000,000 people to get control of this beautiful and ancient land and its people. You can't get much worse. Yet, in spite of what political decisions are made, " . . . permanent allegiance is owed only to a 'de jure' sovereign." (Hersch Lauterpacht, editor, International Law Reports, 1954, p. 84) Why? --- because we owe allegiance only to what is just and true. What is meant by " de jure" in a broad legal sense is " by right," " fitting," " fair," " legitimate," " authentic," " real," " genuine," " lawful" and " true." " De jure sovereignty . . . [is the] time-tested yardstick of international law [and it] should be applied in determining the status of a geographical area and its inhabitants." (Ibid.) But sadly this is not the way it is being done. Hence, when politics determines that a nation is " de jure," then a political " de jure" right is established, but on the other hand, international law principles recognize there can be a real and valid " de jure" sovereign --- a government-in-exile and/or deposed and rightful king whose rights were violated by usurpation. In other words, there is a contradiction. We have politics dominating or running rough shod over the rule of law in complete disregard to the demands of justice.
As a result of a lack of enforcement of what is fair and just and true, a newer definition of "de jure" sovereignty uses the word "opinion." For example, it is now that, “A de jure government [or monarch] is one which, in the opinion of the one using the phrase, ought to possess the powers of sovereignty, though at the time it may be deprived of them." (Herbert W. Briggs, “De Facto and De Jure Recognition: The Arantzazu Mendi,” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 33, no. 4, October 1939, p. 689) Yet, this concept of "de jure," legal and deposed sovereignty is extremely important. The key principle thereof is fundamental, or at the very heart of the lawful right to bear legitimate royal titles and give out regal honors and awards --- from authentic dynastic orders of chivalry, etc. That is, the only way that such can have any meaning legally is because the giver is a true "fons honorum" or fountain of honor. Without "de jure" or rightful sovereignty, no claimant's cause is valid, worthwhile or genuine. So even though this critical concept is dormant, it is lawful and represents recognized equity and justice. For example, "A government of a country invaded by the enemy remains the legitimate government, even if it takes up residence abroad.” (Ernst Wolff, "The International Position of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," The Modern Law Review, vol. 6, no. 4, December 1943, p. 215) And, "No recognition of . . . the exiled government . . . is necessary.” (Ibid., p. 208) Professor Stephen Kerr explained:
. . . de jure Sovereignty [that is, deposed monarchs and governments in exile] represents the moral principle that "might does not make right," it is [therefore] entitled to [full] recognition by other sovereigns [and all nations and all people] adhering to the moral [and ethical] principles implicit in International Law. ("King and Constitution in International Law," The Augustan, 18:4, 1977, p. 126: see: www.augustansociety.org/products/r28)
However, like most rules [or glorious standards] this [one] is usually observed in its breach [that is, in an unrealized form, such as, a broken promise] . . . in modern law. It is nevertheless, recognized as the Ideal [or what is both morally and ethically right]. (Ibid., p. 125)
For example, a man may violate your right to your property by taking it away from you, but your right to that property has not been alienated [you still hold the right], i.e., you are in the right and the robber is in the wrong." ( www.capitalism.org/faq/rights.htm)
A right is something to which one has a just claim. It is the legal or moral entitlement that belongs to a person by law, nature, or tradition. They are moral, proper and just whether they are respected or not. In one article, a new term has been applied to such inequities as a reminder of what is fair and just. It is called " de recto sovereignty" meaning " sovereignty by moral principle or right." (Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, " Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty" 2004: www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/docs/JOPNA-Kalt_Singer.pdf) The International Commission on Nobility and Royalty will uphold what is morally and ethically right and still lawful, even if the laws have been put on the self by modern practices or are now dormant. After all, a " right" is by definition, " A just claim, either moral or legal, upon a society.” (A Team of Experts, Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Political Science, 2000, p. 253) And monarchy is a just and ethical claim important to society. (See: " Briefly, the Benefits of Constitutional Monarchy," " Ideals," and " Advantages")
The "de jure" rights of sovereigns are only inactive, because it is not "politically correct" to right the wrongs perpetrated against deposed monarchs, who have had their rights stolen from them. This bias has been active for over a hundred years. We, however, as an organization, will uphold the ideals and truths about deposed monarchs. In addition, certain international legal principles, still supports and protects royal rights as supreme, legitimate and rightful above all others. What is just, right and true cannot be destroyed if the rules of justice are followed.
(5) What laws are in "breach" that violate the principles of justice or the cause of "de jure" internal sovereignty?
Other than the denial by all courts of law to enforce their rights as already discussed, there is a " breach" in the practice of official " recognitions" for deposed monarchs and governments in exile. The United Nations and separate modern nations only recognize whoever is in control of a country regardless of the ethical considerations involved. For example, by its very nature, a usurper or revolutionary regime is illegal and in the wrong, and no rule of logic can change this. It is treason. Yet, the " de jure" rights of a lawful, ousted government will be completely neglected and ignored. There is nothing right about this, but countries now pay little or no attention as to whether a regime is legitimate. Nor do they consider the validity, or rightfulness, of the claims of dispossessed governments or monarchs. The sad result is " de jure" and lawful governments in exile and " de jure" kings and sovereign princes, who have been robbed of their lawful rights are forgotten; and justice, one of the greatest principles known to mankind, is violated. This is reprehensible, but this breach of equity and truth is being ignored; such that, " According to international law, there is no way for a government in exile [or deposed monarch] to obtain [international] legitimacy [or recognition] other than by returning to its ‘original location’ and reasserting its governance there." (Richard W. Hartzell, " Questions of Sovereignty --- the Montevideo Convention and Territorial Cession," November 2005: www.taiwanadvice.com/harintmcexc.htm)
Many countries side-step these important responsibilities to properly label "de jure" those who are lawful governments from those who are merely "defacto," by using the 1930 Estrada doctrine or something very similar. They do this:
. . . because many States view it as politically difficult to announce publicly, one way or another, whether they "recognise" a new government, and would prefer simply to open diplomatic channels or otherwise develop relations with the new government without issuing a pronouncement that could be construed as approval [or disapproval] of the new government. (Sean D. Murphy, "Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 48, no. 3, July 1999, p. 567)
There are usually two reasons for doing anything. The one that sounds good and then the real reason. Nations often choose what will promote their economic growth and development above the principles of justice and truth. They give the good sounding justification that they are promoting international peace and stability, when the real reason, or hidden agenda, is the profit motive. There is nothing wrong with the profit motive if it is done with integrity, but countries, without conscience, marginalize and discredit the higher values and ideals of civilization to prosper. It is understandable, but morally objectionable.
As a result, ". . . the government de facto is one which is actually in possession of power [and is officially recognized] while a government de jure is one which ought (apparently in law) to possess it [is denied or disregarded]. (Ibid., p. 10) Thus, those who "ought" to be recognized are flushed down the sewer, denigrated, discarded and thrown away, as though no injustice took place. Thus the great ideals of all time and eternity are swept under the rug for the sake of getting along or in the interests of commercial gain.
Because nation-states cannot be forced to practice just recognitions, the practice of politically motivated recognitions, that fail to recognize lawful deposed monarchs or governments, will continue even though this practice has been recognized to be problematic.
“ Recognition” is not a codified duty, nor an exact science. Every country is free to recognize or not to recognize. There are no regulations or guidelines to make it clear what each should do. Every practice of it is left open, or allowed to be flexible; such that, " . . . Recognition [has become merely]. . . expressing an opinion on the legal status of an entity . . . ." (Stefan Talmon, " Recognition Of States and Governments in International Law," Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy --- Biweekly, vol. I, no. 19, November 1, 2008) Being an " opinion," it does not establish any kind of legal reality. Nor does it reflect what is right or just for ". . . States often chose to recognise the usurper [an unlawful government] on purely political considerations [which are fundamentally wrong]." (Dr. Stephen Kerr, letter of 1/21/10) The point being that, “ [True] Legitimate authority is primarily a moral not a legal concept [nor a political one]. . . .” ( Ethics in International Affairs: Theories and Cases, 2000, p. 87) Self-serving decisions are not usually in the best interests of society or the world.
Because of the confusion and lack of law, it is widely recognized that, “Legally, State recognition can be neither declaratory, nor translative, of a . . . title [to sovereignty].” (Palestine and International Law: the Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1973, p. 94) In other words, “The recognition of a . . . state cannot affect the title [of another state on way or the other]. . . ." (University of Manchester, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 44) If a considerable number of others states likewise recognized title, the effect is still questionable, but may "form an ingredient of a process of consolidation." (Ibid.) But this impacts external sovereignty only --- not the most important part of sovereignty, which is internal nor the sovereignty of deposed monarchs or ousted legitimate governments.
Thus, recognition has little moral value in the world chiefly because all decisions are self-serving and have no ethical basis. The rules of law and justice have not prevailed. For example, the International Law Commission admits that, " . . . A listing of acts that result in recognition does not exist." (Sixth Report on unilateral acts of States, International Law Commission Fifty-fifth Session, No. 25, May 2003, p. 8) The only uniform practice is to generally recognize countries neutrally without judgment or opinion.
Since countries are not really recognizing each other as legitimate, nor judging each other as "defacto" or "de jure," right or wrong, then whether they are actually "defacto" or "de jure" in a legal sense is being left open and unsettled. "The only criterion [now] in international law for the recognition of an authority as the government of a State is its exercise of effective control over the State's territory." (op.cit., Stefan Talmon, 2008) Andrew Valls explains, “What appears to have happened is that the moral concept of right authority has been replaced by the conception of compétence de guerre [defacto or real possession of the territory]. . . .” (op.cit., Andrew Valls) In other words, "The word de jure adds nothing in practice to recognition itself, except as a courtesy. . . ." (Herbert W. Briggs, "De Facto and De Jure Recognition: The Arantzazu Mendi," The American Journal International Law, vol. 33, no. 4, October 1939, p. 691) So no one needs to use these terms anymore in recognitions, because they have become meaningless. Part of the reason for this is that:
The European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice, along with INGOs, IGOs, and NGOs, are emblematic of the development of institutions that increasingly alter the terms and conditions of dejure and de facto sovereignty. (Patrick S. O'Donnell, "Sovereignty Past & Present," 2004: www.ihrr.net/download
-document/261-sovereignty
_past__present?mode=view)
Hence, "There has . . . been an inexcusable confusion in the use of the terms defacto and de jure recognition, and defacto and de jure governments." (Philip Marshall Brown, "The Recognition of New States and New Governments," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 30, no. 4, October 1936, p. 690)
The failure to understand the distinction between the defacto recognition of a new state or government and de jure recognition, has been in part caused by a careless use of term. " The subject has been unduly complicated," writes Borchard, " by the chameleonic use of the term defacto, which has been applied promiscuously to de facto authorities in the field, to governments not established by constitutional means, as an adjective to qualify recognition. . . . By recognizing a government as defacto merely [or only], no judgment is being passed on the lawfulness [legitimacy or rightfulness] of that government. (op.cit., Herbert W. Briggs, p. 689)
Sadly, "Lack of definition is common in international law. . . ." Turki Althunayan, Dealing with the Fragmented International Legal Environment, 2010, p. 98) "De jure" sovereignty is one of the problems.
In the Arantzazu Mendi we find Slesser, L. J., for the Court of Appeal, quoting Bankes, L. J., in Luther vs. Sagor, who quoted Wheaten, who quoted Montague Bernard that "A de jure government [or monarch] is one which, in the opinion of the one using the phrase, ought to possess the powers of sovereignty, though at the time it may be deprived of them. (Ibid.)
The terms de facto and dejure are applicable to governments in a purely relative sense. That is to say, which of the two is properly descriptive of a given political organization depends upon the point of view of those who characterize it.
(W. W. Willoughby, “Government,” The Americana: A Universal Reference Library, Frederick Converse Beach & George Edwin Rines, editors, 1912)
Since " de jure" is an " opinion" or " relative" in the mind of the " observer," according to their " point of view," the term can be subjectively used as deemed appropriate, but it does not fit well with diplomatic recognition in modern times. That is, the terms " de facto" / " de jure" was " a rather confusing distinction, recently becoming obsolete, but once commonly used in the international practice of recognizing governments. . . ." (Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International law: A Dictionary, 2005, p. 102) It was tried for awhile and then discarded for the most part because no uniform law or consensus was ever created in regard to it.
Because " de jure" recognition is so indistinct and obscure, legally and otherwise, no wonder countries generally refrain from the use of such distinctions in their recognitions. In fact, " The characteristic of a government as de facto or de jure belongs properly in another category of ideas and should not concern either the international jurist or the recognizing state." (Ibid., p. 689-690) " . . . Government does not pretend [except in rare instances] to express any opinion on the legality or other wise of the means by which its power has been obtained." (Ibid., p. 693) In other words, nation-states do not judge other countries as " de jure," legitimate, or as just any longer, or if they do, it is done very rarely. Neither do they judge them as being unjust and unlawful, but remain neutral as a general rule. The outcome of modern practice is that, " . . . international [in other words, external] recognition is not [final or] conclusive on the legitimacy of a revolutionary regime --- or any regime, for that matter." (Simeon C. R. McIntosh, Kelsen in the "Grenada court": Essays on Revolutionary Legality, 2008, p. 15) " . . . Sovereignty is neither created by recognition nor destroyed by nonrecognition.” (T he New Encyclopaedia Britannica, edition 15, part 3, vol 17, 1981, p. 312)
"A de facto government is one which is really in possession of them [the country], although the possession may be wrongful or precarious." (op.cit., Herbert W. Briggs, p. 689) Membership in the United Nations does not make such a country "de jure" or legitimate or right its wrongs, because the only requirement for membership in the United Nations, according to their Charter, (chapter 2, article 4) is that they are a "peace-loving" state, which accepts the "obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations." (www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter2.shtml)
In other words, membership in the United Nations only gives recognition that a government can carry on these obligations. " De jure" internal status is not created. For example, “ Kissinger [while U. S. Secretary of State] points out that his use of legitimacy 'means no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements and about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.'” (Harold Hance Sprout, James N. Rosenau, Margaret Tuttle Sprout, Vincent Davis & Maurice A. East, The Analysis of International Politics, 1972, p. 192) Nothing more is meant by it. The point is, " . . . De facto sovereignty [control of the territory] is . . . adequate to maintain the everyday authority of governments.” (Allen D. Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice, 1993, p. 142) Therefore, that is all that diplomatic recognition includes. The determination of rightfulness is being left open and unanswered. In other words, " . . . the doctrine of non-recognition . . . is an integral part of modem international law. . . ." (op.cit., Ernst Wolff, p. 208)
True sovereignty exists as a separate entity or reality completely outside the provinces of formal recognition. It is not dependent on outside recognition. In fact, it is acknowledged that, "Recognition by no means produces subjects of international law. It merely creates a legal basis for relations between the recognizing and recognized states." (Vinod K. Lall & Danial Khemchand, Encyclopaedia of International Law, 1997, p. 46) It does not create or destroy rightful sovereignty. Part of the confusion is the failure to distinquish between internal and external sovereignty. External sovereignty is what international law primarily focuses on. External sovereignty is a matter of independence or freedom from the interference of others and the right to be a member of the community of nations. This is the fundamental realm of international sovereignty law --- equality and independence.
External sovereignty consists of two elements:
1. de jure recognition by the international community of a state’s
independence; that is, a state in the international system is free and equal;
and
2. de facto external independence; that is, no outsider exercises control within a state’s territory. (Donald W Potter, "State Responsibility, Sovereignty, and Failed States," Refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference University of Adelaide, 29 September-1 October 2004, pp. 11-12)
" Externally, sovereignty is the entry ticket into the society of states. Recognition on the part of other states helps to ensure territorial integrity and is the entree into participating in diplomacy and international organizations on an equal footing with other states." (Eric Brahm, " Sovereignty," September 2004: www.beyondintractability.org/essay/sovereignty) " The concept of sovereignty in international law most often connotes [implies or relates to] external sovereignty." ( Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, revised 2009: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty)
The internal sovereignty of a State [that which is not a primary matter of international law] manifests itself through the performance of three governmental functions: (1) The Legislative, which makes laws; (2) The Judicial, which interprets and applies laws; (3) The Executive, which enforces laws. (William Callyhan Robinson, Elementary Law, 1910, p. 416) Internal sovereignty is supremacy or freedom to choose or make decisions within ones own territory. This most closely resembles the definition of sovereignty itself. It is defined as “ supreme [or ultimate power or] authority within a territory.” (op.cit., Eric Brahm) This supreme domestic power had great and powerful rights as the highest power of all within the boundaries of its land. Internal sovereignty revolves around domestic law, rather than international law. It is not dependent on outside forces, but internal rules and law of the countries own making.
The rights of internal sovereignty include [whether recognized by the international world or not, that is, outside of the jurisdiction of international law, its privileges are]:
(1) The right to a free choice, settlement and alteration of the internal Constitution and Government, without the intermeddling of any Foreign State.
(2) The right to territorial inviolability, and the free use and enjoyment of property.
(3) The right of self-preservation, and this by the defense which prevents, as well as by that which repels, attack.
(4) The right to a free development of national resources by commerce.
(5) The right of acquisition, whether original or derivative, both of territorial possessions and rights.
(6) The right to absolute and uncontrolled jurisdiction over all persons and things within and, in certain exceptional cases, without the limits of the territory. [Sir Robert Phillimore, On International Law, vol. 1, sec. cxlv, 1854]
These rights are all absolute, and quite independent of any recognition of the external sovereignty by other States . . . . (Charles St. Julian, The International Status of Fiji, 1872, p. 3)
That is:
A new state does not require recognition of other states to confirm its internal sovereignty. So long as it confines its actions to its citizens and to the limits of its own territory, it may dispense with such recognition; but, if it desires to enter the society of nations, recognition becomes necessary to entitle it to participation." (New York (State) Supreme Court, The New York Supplement, vol. 195, September 11 to October 2, 1922, p. 472)
In other words:
. . . In order to consider the sovereignty of a State as complete in the Law of Nations, there is no need for recognition by foreign powers, thought the latter may appear useful, the defacto existence of sovereignty is sufficient." (Saalfeld, Handbuch das positiven Volkerrechts, 1833, p. 189)
Therefore, it should not be any surprise that ". . . Courts agree that sovereignty can exist in the absence of recognition by any state. . . ." (Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: a Concise Introduction, 1979, p. 120) The point is, " . . . sovereignty is not something that is decided by other countries. They can only recognize it or not." (Frank Muyard, Director, Taipei Office, French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), April 1-2, 2005: www.cefc.com.hk) Again, " The internal sovereignty of a state does not, in any degree, depend upon its recognition by other states." (John King, A Commentary on the Law and True Construction of the Federal Constitution, 1871, p. 400) It is sovereign whether it is recognized or not.
With these concepts firmly in mind, we can introduce a new and important understanding, and that is, that there is both a "de jure internal sovereignty" and a "de jure external one" which are two distinct and separate things. (op.cit., Frank Muyard) De jure (or legal) external sovereignty is legal independence and equality among nations, and deals almost exclusively with foreign affairs. Whereas, internal legal (or de jure) sovereignty is the right or exclusive domain of internal affairs or the right to rule and govern within a lawful territory. The "de jure external one" is where international law reigns. On the other hand, "de jure [rightful or legal] internal sovereignty," which international laws have little to do with, is basically, or for the most part, outside the pale or jurisdiction of the international system. This is the primary sovereign domain of deposed monarchs and legitimate governments in exile, which explains why they are not recognized by the international system.
" Internal sovereignty is [something] . . . which is inherent [basic or deeply rooted] in the people of any State, or vested in its ruler, by its . . . constitution or fundamental laws." (Henry Wheaton & Coleman Phillipson, Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 1904, p. 35) These fundamental core rules, that are at the fountainhead of monarchy, gave sovereignty, the supreme and ultimate internal authority of the state, to the kings and sovereign princes and their families. It was established to go from father to son down through the generations and was never to end or terminate as long as these families continued to exist. This permanent royal proprietary right of “ internal sovereignty . . . establishes the ultimate authority [or supreme rights] over individuals or groups within the . . . territory.” ( The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, part 3, vol. 17, 1981, p. 311) The point is:
Once the people had agreed upon the fundamental law of the kingdom, and given the king and his descendants power over them, [so that all royal rights were owned, possessed and retained by the royal house] . . . the natural right to govern the body politic resided henceforth in full only in the person of the king. (Jacques Maritain, “The Concept of Sovereignty,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 44, no. 2, 1950, p. 348)
It gave “. . . the king . . . supreme power which was natural and inalienable, inalienable to such a degree that [even] dethroned kings and their descendants kept this right forever [without end as long as they continued to exist]. . . .” (Ibid. & Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, 1998, p. 37) These rights are immutable, perpetual and endless --- they never end.
Phillip Marshall Brown, a distinguished international lawyer, confirms this. He wrote on the sovereignty of "de jure" kings and princes in exile, who were living in England during World War II, and who had been robbed of the right to rule their own territories. He stated that:
A nation is much more than an outward form of territory and government. . . . So long as they [those who hold sovereignty] cherish sovereignty in their hearts their nation [kingdom or principality] is not dead. It may be prostate and helpless. . . . [Nevertheless] It is not to be denied the symbols and forms of sovereignty. . . . [Their sovereignty] may be suspended, in exile, a mere figment even of reality, derided and discouraged, and yet entitled to every respect. [Why? Because we are] not dealing with fictions, [these] valiant standard bearers of sovereignty . . . in faith and confidence [have] . . . inalienable, immutable rights. (“Sovereignty in Exile,” 35 American Journal of International Law (1941) 666-668) (http://links.jstor.org
/sici?sici=0002-9300(194110)35%3A4%3C666%3ASIE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K)
These rights are endless. Professor Emilio Furno, an advocate in the Supreme Court of Appeal in Italy, explained:
. . . A deposed Sovereign [and his successors have an] . . . undeniable [and] . . . an absolute personal right [of full sovereignty] of which the subject [the king or sovereign prince] may never divest himself and which needs no ratification or recognition on the part of any other authority whatsoever. ("The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders", Rivista Penale, No.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70)
"A deposed monarch remained [that is, continues], in law, a [de jure, legal or rightful] monarch." (Charlotte Catherine Wells, Law and citizenship in early modern France, Issue 1, 1995, p. 198) This is because, "In a monarchy, the monarchy is the possessor [owner] of Legal Sovereignty [that is, legal rights and legal supremacy]. . . ." (Durga K. Sarmah, Political Science, vol. 1, 2004, p. 67) This is because ". . . the sovereignty held by the displaced legal sovereign [a deposed monarch] is known as De jure [or legal] Sovereignty." (Ibid.) "Legal sovereignty [is] . . . a claim to exercise the supreme legal authority that rests on a legal right. . . ." (Tudor Jones, Modern Political Thinkers and Ideas: an Historical Introduction, 2002, p. 4) This right is even more explicit and obvious in the international principles of “prescription” as shall be seen in giving deposed monarchs and their successors endless rights that never end provided they are kept alive by the principles of justice deeply rooted in the legal concepts of "prescription."
The “ de jure” internal sovereignty of ousted governments, holding the exclusive right of supreme power is a correct principle of justice and equity. Why? Because, " [sovereignty] is undivided [or undividable] --- there is only one truth, one justice; and, consequently, only one rightful sovereignty. It is, moreover, permanent, and unchangeable --- for truth cannot [be] altered [and still remain true]." (François Pierre G. Guizot, Lectures on European Civilization, 1837, p. 289) To be indivisible is to be inseparable, unbreakable, indestructible, permanent and inalienable. Again, " as briefly indicated above, the concept of sovereignty formally implies a power that is absolute, perpetual, indivisible, imprescriptible and inalienable." (Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, 2002, p. 17) In other words, the very characteristics and qualities of sovereignty itself proclaims why it can be forever, if it is hereditary and if, and only if, it is legally maintained according to the international rules of “ prescription.”
In the next answer, the rules of " prescription" will be introduced as a great boon to justice and everything that is right and good in this field. " Prescription" is one of the few principles of justice that actually deals with " de jure internal sovereignty" --- the sovereignty of deposed monarchs and legitimate governments in exile, which most international law completely ignores. " Prescription" is about the internal right to govern of a former ruler versus the defacto internal and external ruling right of the usurper. It can preserve royalty rights forever and without end, or it can cause it to be forfeited to the point that the claim cannot be reinstated --- such that, it comes to a permanent end. It is that powerful and it is that important.
(6) Dynasty never forfeits its rights. Those rights cannot be forfeited. The principle of “juris sanguinis” (right of blood) operates here. Dr. Paulo Bonavides in his book "Political Sciences" (Ciência Política), page 126 declared:
Sovereignty is one and indivisible, it cannot be delegated, SOVEREIGNTY IS IRREVOCABLE, SOVEREIGNTY IS PERPETUAL, sovereignty is a supreme power, these are the main points of characterization that made Bodin's sovereignty in the seventeenth century an essential element of State.
Sovereignty is permanent in a royal house, if it is hereditary, because by inheritance law, hereditary rights are passed on to rightful heirs. The wording from the following treaties demonstrates this well-known principle as it relates to sovereignty:
(a) Territory was given to Imperial Russia to “. . . be possessed by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his heirs and successors, for ever.” (T. C. Hansard, ed., The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time, vol. 32, 1816, p. 115)
(b) Another royal house was given principalities to the king and “. . . his heirs and successors, in perpetual [never ending] sovereignty. . . .” (Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (Authorized edition), vol. 107, 1849, p. 1152)
(c) Again, “. . . we are now in possession of Guienne and Gascony, to hold forever by us, our heirs and successors, in the same manner that the kings of France have always held them. . . .” (Sir John Froissart , Chronicles of England, France, Spain, and the Adjoining Countries, 1880, p. 13)
(d) ". . . the full sovereignty of the Northern Island of New Zealand vests in Her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, for ever." (Facsimiles of the Declaration of independence and the Treaty of Waitangi , 1887, p. 11)
(e) ". . . his heirs and successors, with all the rights of sovereignty, of absolute power and entire dominion . . . shall remain in his possession evermore. . . ." (Cobbett's Weekly Political Register, vol 1, no. 14, 1802, p. 426)
(f) ". . . His heirs and successors, shall have, hold, keep and enjoy forever, with plenary right of sovereignty, dominion, possession and property, all those lands. . . ." (The Case of Venezuela: A Reply, A Special Report of the Government of Venezuela, 1896, p. 67) Or as Hugo Grotius (1558-1645), one of the founding fathers of international law, declared, “. . . the successor has a right to all the privileges and prerogatives that his ancestors enjoyed. . . .” (On the Law of War and Peace, Book I, chapter III, no. 10) This is because the royal house owns the right to rule as part of their patrimony and this possession of sovereignty and property is transferred by hereditary succession to the next in line down through their generations forever. Baroni W. Santos in his book Treaty of Heraldry declared:
The doctrine [of dynastic succession law] and [international] jurisprudence have confirmed that the territorial power is not necessary for the exercise of the dynasty, for they are inserted in the person of the sovereign, which keeps the same after the loss of the throne, passing them regularly to their heirs and successors [ad infinitum].
[In other words] the loss of its territory in no way diminishes its sovereign powers, [in the least] because these are inherent in the person of the sovereign, transmitting it, perpetually to their descendants. (Vol. I, 5th ed., 1978, p. 197-198)
Jean J. Burlamaqui (1694-1748), one of the great philosophers in international law, wrote, " Every [sovereign has] a right to succeed in his rank, and transmits this right to his descendants, . . . though he has never reigned himself, that is to say, the right of the deceased passes to the living" over and over again from one generation to another down through the long corridors of time endlessly and perpetually, as long as there is a living heir using their titles, etc. ( www.constitution.org/burla/burla_2203.txt)
Nevertheless, a royal heir could lose, not only the privilege to rule the kingdom, but through abandonment, abdication, alienation, renunciation, cession, acquiescence, prescription and estoppel, he can also, or in addition, altogether lose his right to be a royal person and every privilege that goes with it, and thus become a commoner with no royal or imperial prerogative left. This means to lose without recourse the privilege of using exalted titles or to preside over a true order of chivalry, etc. The point is, any birthright can be ruined and totally destroyed by bad choices, recklessness, foolishness, serious crime or neglect, which will be explained in the following paragraphs.
In other words, Dr. Bonavide's statement above is true --- sovereignty can be irrevocable and perpetual, but his statement does not tell the equally important other side of the story. His statement must be qualified to be accurate, factual and informative. In other words, a deeper understanding of sovereignty and the principles that surround it clearly demonstrate the truth that royalty can be lost, and that loss is just as permanent and endless as its potential to last forever is real and right and true. And, once lost, it cannot be renewed, started over or reinstitution after the fact. Johann Wolfgang Textor von Goethe, (1749-1832) the famous German publicist and International lawyer, declared:
. . . a King who has been driven from his Kingdom by force of arms, and has lost possession of his [territorial or defacto] sovereignty, has not thereby lost his right, or at any rate not irrevocably, unless he has in the meanwhile given his assent [his acquiescence] thereto; but he loses it conclusively at the moment when he consents [acquiesces or agrees] to transfer of it to the Estates, i.e. Parliament or to his rebel subjects, and then it must be recognized that the Kingdom has been made into a State which has been founded in accordance with the Law of Nations. (Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 1680, p. 88)
He explained how sovereignty can be gained, lost or transferred:
The modes of acquiring Kingdoms under the Law of Nations are: Election [elected to office], Succession [ruling rights given to a lawful heir], Conquest [creating "defacto" sovereignty and usurping a lawful king or complete and total subjugation leaving no one to carry on the governing rights of the nation --- this is called debellatio], Alienation [the ceding or giving away of the kingdom to another] and Prescription [which we will discuss]." (Ibid., p. 77)
"De jure" or lawful internal sovereignty is lost by the legal principles of "conquest," "alienation" and "prescription." We will look at "prescription" as a particularly important legal concept that destroys “de jure” imperial and royal rights to title and royal prerogatives, but can also preserve and maintain them forever. Lassa Francis L. Oppenheim (1858-1919), a renowned German jurist regarded by many as the father of the discipline of international law, wrote:
. . . Prescription in International Law may . . . be deemed as the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory through continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over it. . . . (International Law, vol. 1, Ch. XIII, No. 242, 1910, p. 309)
As long as other Powers [the "de jure" sovereign in this context] keep[s] up protests and claims [his royal rights, then they are safe]. . . . But after such protests and claims, if any, cease to be repeated, the actual possession [of sovereignty] ceases to be disturbed. . . . (Ibid., pp. 309-310)
Then the royal king or prince ceases to be a true king or prince as his "de jure" rights are forfeited to the usurper. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Law Enforcement:
Prescription ([in] international law) [is] the acquisition of title [ownership] to territory through an uncontested exercise of sovereignty over an extended period of time. Prescription presupposes a prior sovereign authority whose control and administration over the territory in question has lapsed through:
• failure to occupy,
• failure to administer,
• abandonment or neglect,
• a wrongful original claim, or
. . . If a state takes over the territory of another state and treats it as its own territory, the other state [the "de jure" sovereign in this case] has an obligation to protest. If it [or he] does not, the silence may be considered acquiescence [or acceptance] to the prescription [or an abandonment]. ( www.taiwandocuments.org/sovereignty.htm)
Abandonment, neglect or failure to contest a claim are all ways to lose rights permanently and forever. Again, " For prescription to apply, the state with title [the de jure king or his successors] to the [lost] territory must acquiesce to the action of the other [the usurper or defacto] state." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_status_of_Taiwan)
Emerich de Vattel, one of the most important of the founding fathers of international law, wrote:
Every proprietor [of the great honor and privilege of "de jure" sovereignty] who expressly commits, or omits, certain acts [such as, the express failure to use his titles], which he cannot commit or omit without renouncing his right, sufficiently indicates by such commission or omission that it is not his intention to preserve it, unless, by an express reservation, he declare the contrary. (See The Law of Nations, Book II, ch. XI, Nos. 142, 144-146, 149 and see Article 45 and Article 31.3(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties)
However, Stephen P. Kerr, B.B.A., J.D., LL.M., M.A.T., a World Court Litigator and Special International Legal Counsel to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine and a Professor of Law at Antioch University Law School in Washington, D.C., made it clear that, ". . .de jure possession of sovereignty continues so long as the de jure ruler or government does not surrender his sovereignty [his rightful claim] to the usurper." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis Juris Gentium, Chapter 10, Nos. 9-11) Professor Kerr also declared that:
Upon the fall, dispossession, or usurpation of a monarchy, the de jure legal rights to the succession of that monarchy may be kept alive indefinitely [that is, without an end, continually] through the legal vehicle of making diplomatic protests against the usurpation. (See: " Dynastic Law") (See Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Le Droit des gens, Book II, chapter II, no's. 145-146)
In other words, " Such Claimants are de jure Sovereigns and, as such, Head of the Government-in-Exile of their usurped country." (Ibid.) However, when the protest ceases, the royal rights are extinguished. That is, " It [the loss of 'de jure' sovereignty] depends as much on the quiescence [inactivity or lack of effort] of the former sovereign as on the consolidation [of rulership] through time of the new.” (R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 23) In other words, " Title must be maintained, or it will be lost as a result of failure to . . . protest the actions of an acquiring power. Conduct [therefore] is thus very important. (Ibid., p. 5) It is, in fact, extremely important, because, " After a reasonable period of time, to be determined in each case on an ad hoc basis, the title will vest in the new state in the absence of protest. It might be mentioned at this point that protests are extremely important in international law." (Ibid., p. 5) It is so important that, “ The absence of protest . . . forms a constituent element of --- estoppel or prescription. Like these two generally accepted legal principles, the far-reaching effect of the failure to protest is not a mere artificiality of the law. It is an essential requirement [to keep one's rights alive]. . . ." (Hersh Lauterpacht, International Law: General Works, 1977, p. 164)
(7) How does a royal family maintain their rights? What is required? What is the proper protest that is acceptable and protective?
Loss of title is achieved through acquiescence. D. H. N. Johnson explained that:
Such acquiescence is implied . . . where the interested and affected states [deposed kings or their successors in our case] have failed within a reasonable period of time to refer the matter to the appropriate international organization or international tribunal or . . . where no such action was possible --- have failed to manifest their opposition in a sufficiently positive manner through the instrumentality of diplomatic protests. ("Acquisitive Prescription in International Law," British Journal of International Law 27, 1950, pp. 332, 353-354)
Again, ". . . mere diplomatic protest is not sufficient. It must be followed by a reference to an appropriate international organization or international tribunal unless it is not possible to do so." (S. K. Verma, An Introduction to Public International Law, 2004, p. 121) Because of the powerful biases against monarchy, no international tribunal will take on a case involving a "de jure" monarch's, or his successor's, right to rule his kingdom or principality. For example, the International Court of Justice, according to their own guidelines, will not take any case that does not involve currently recognized sovereign states. So how does a "de jure" monarch, or his successors, maintain their rights?
According to Emerich de Vattel (1614-1667), considered one of the founding fathers of international law, the way to keep and maintain imperial or royal rights alive forever was by protest, which was elaborated in question and answer number 3 on the principle of “ prescription.” He declared, “ With sovereigns [kings or sovereign princes the way to do so] is . . . to retain the title and the arms of a sovereignty or a province, as an evidence that they do not relinquish their claims to it." ( The Law of Nations, Book 2, Chapter XI, Nos. 145-146)
This is the bottom line. Other kinds of protests are helpful or ancillary, but using titles are the most fundamental, basic and necessary way to proclaim to the world that one has not given in, but still retains the claim to the full majesty and glory of the monarchy. This is the bare minimum. Stephen Kerr, a world court litigator, declared, "when appropriate, recognizing worthy individuals with knighthoods and other decorations or honor at their command" further confirms their royal status as active members of the international community and as rightful heirs to their former "defacto" thrones. (op.cit.) Such an act is equal to "a series of competent protests [which] will keep a de jure claim alive indefinitely" or forever. (Ibid.)
If the royal family forsakes, or no longer considers the titles important enough to use in one generation, and the possible heir does not claim his right before the death of his negligent father, then a presumption of abandonment is automatically made, which means a total forfeiture has occurred. This action means a permanent end to their special and unique entitlements --- royal rights that cannot be revived or renegotiated. It is final or set in stone. It can't be fixed. Dr. Stephen Kerr specifies that:
De jure Sovereignty lasts as long as the claimant keeps up his protest against the usurpation of his Sovereignty [which means it can last forever]. This is done by means of diplomatic protests. Such diplomatic protests are issued on the death of one claimant upon the occasion that the new claimant takes up the claim. (Letter of 1/21/10)
This is why one generation can destroy all rights, because the claim must be renewed. The use of sovereign titles, heraldric arms, etc. is such a powerful witness to all the earth that one is the true heir to the throne that it creates an unmistakeable message that cannot be push aside to mean anything, but what it means. Such a proclaimation is the equivalent of a constant and unending reminder or diplomatic protest to all the world against the usurpation of actual rule. And such "protests are sufficient to avoid prescription [the total loss of sovereign and royal rights] and there is no requirement to refer [such] a dispute to international tribunals or other settlement mechanisms." (Jessup, "Bench Memorandum," p. 12) In other words:
Nobiliary International law states that the heads of the Houses of sovereign descent who have not incurred debellatio [have not renounced or abandoned], retain forever the exercise of the powers attaching to them, absolutely irrespective of any territorial possession. They are protected by the continued use of their rights and titles of nobility. . . . ( Monarchist World Magazine # 2, August 1955)
The reason a “de jure” monarch, or his successors, must use their titles to keep their royal rights was explain by Vattel in The Law of Nations. (www.constitution.org
/vattel/vattel_02.htm) It stated as an introduction that:
. . . the law of nature lays an injunction on the proprietor to take care of his property, and imposes on him an obligation to make known his rights, that others may not be led into error: it is on these conditions alone that she approves of the property vested in him, and secures him in the possession. (Book II, Number 141)
Now for the conclusion and the result:
If he has neglected it [failed to assert his titles] for such a length of time . . . the law of nature will no longer allow him to revive and assert his claims. . . . (Ibid.)
Again:
. . . the law of nature ordained that all men should respect the right of private property in him who makes use of it? For the same reason, therefore, the same law requires that every proprietor who for a long time and without any just reason neglects his right, should be presumed to have entirely renounced and abandoned it. This is what forms the absolute presumption (juris et de jure) of its abandonment, --- a presumption, upon which another person [the subsequent government] is legally entitled to appropriate to himself the thing so abandoned. (Ibid.)
Hence, the unequivocal injunction to use one's titles or lose them forever.
(8) Where is a modern court decree that sustains this principle?
The "Permanent Court of Arbitration" at The Hague heard the Island of Palmas case. In 1925, the United States brought a complaint against the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It involved who has the supreme right to rule, or own the sovereignty over this territory which is near the Philippines. The legal principle of "prescription" was used to determined the outcome of who has both "de jure," or lawful sovereignty, as well as "defacto" or physical control over the land and its people, which was completed in 1928. The "de jure" sovereign (The United States) lost all rights, because of their neglect, while the Dutch acted as sovereign rulers over this territory and its people over a long, uncontested period of time without any protest or claim made by the U.S. government. All the conditions of "prescription" were present. Hence, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was awarded recognition for having title to all the "de jure" privileges and prerogatives.
The United States actually lost their "de jure" rights long before the Tribunal occurred because they totally neglected their claim and made no protest whatsoever, which is required to keep the intangible right to rule and govern. "A title [to sovereignty] once abandoned whether tacitly [by implication] or expressly, cannot be resumed [continued, started over or reconstituted]." (T. Twiss, The Oregon Question Examined, 1840, p. 24) In other words, the principle of "estoppel" is automatically applied, which establishes that a ". . . person is prevented from arguing and rebutting a previously made (explicit [that is, straightforward] or tacit [which means implied]) statement of fact or representation on [the] same issue." (Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes, "Estoppel, acquiescence and recognition in territorial and boundary dispute," Boundary and Territory Briefing, vol. 2, no. 8, 2000, p. 4)
In other words, they are precluded from later ". . . making claims to the contrary." (www.belluckfox.com/legal-glossarye.html) Estoppel law applies where a person knows or ought to know that he is entitled to enforce his right and neglects to do so for such a length of time as would imply that he intended to waive or abandon his right. Thus, ". . . Acquiescence [silence on the part of a "de jure" king or his successors] . . . acts as a preclusion or estoppel . . . [in other words, it results in a permanent] waiver of rights. . . ." (E. Lauterpacht, International Law Reports 33, 1967, p. 91) The entitlement, then, is extinguished and the loss is total, complete and absolute. It cannot be taken back or renewed. It is effectively destroyed.
Three international law concepts or principles impact "de jure" sovereign or royal rights:
2. " . . . The concept of acquiescence is similar to that of implied waiver [or implied consent, implied abandonment or the implied renunciation of all rights]." (Ibid.) In acquiescence, " . . . the claimant State [or "de jure" monarch or his successors] has failed to assert its [or his] claim and that it thereby has implicitly accepted its extinction." (Ibid.) " . . . Both implied waiver and acquiescence are based on the same rationale, namely the idea that a certain statement may be inferred from conduct, be it action or inaction." (Ibid.)
3. Extinctive prescription happens when ". . . a State [or "de jure" king or his rightful successors] that does not present claims . . . within a given period of time permanently loses its right to do so, even where it has not acquiesced in their extinction." (Ibid.)
"Waiver, acquiescence and extinctive prescription are legal concepts entailing the same effect – they lead to the loss of a right or claim." (Ibid.) "Once the conditions for any of them are met, the claimant State’s right [or "de jure" monarch's right] . . . ceases to exist." (Ibid.) (See also the International Law Commission's commentary to article 45 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
The point is, a " de jure" title to sovereignty must be perpetuated constantly in every generation. Professor D. H. N. Johnson declared, " As Judge Huber indicated in the Island of Palmas case, it is necessary that a title be . . . continuously maintained. . . .” (“ Consolidation as a Root of Title in International Law,” The Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 13, no. 2, Nov. 1955, p. 223) Otherwise it is lost forever.
Judge Huber [in the Island of Palmas case on sovereignty] did well to stress the importance of maintaining titles as well as acquiring them, because there is a tendency among the writers to place less emphasis upon this aspect of the matter. It is true that methods of losing titles are sometimes classified along with methods of acquiring them. But this practice seems to presuppose that, if a title is not actually lost through one of the recognized methods of loss, it is automatically maintained. (Ibid., p. 224)
In other words, there is both " acquisitive prescription" and " extinctive prescription." (S. K. Verma, An Introduction to Public International Law, 2004, p. 121) In " extinctive prescription" " de jure" rights are revoked if the title is not " continuously maintained." (Ibid.) In other words, “ de jure” sovereignty is not " automatically maintained." It must be kept up and renewed in every generation. As an absolute minimum, royal rights are continued by the consistent, uninterrupted use of royal titles and arms. Or, a loss of this precious legal reality is the sure and absolute. Once lost, the only way this could be legally fixed is if the nation as a whole makes one of the disenfranchised descendants, who is now merely a commoner with no special rights, their new sovereign and a new dynasty is created or begun anew.
Although "prescription" cases are somewhat rare in modern times, still the law is upheld as genuine and applicable to cases involving sovereignty as they arise. "The principle of extinctive prescription (bars of claims by lapse of time) is widely recognized as a general principle of law constituting part of international law; and has been accepted and applied by arbitral tribunals." (Greenriver Enterprizes Six Nations, Inc., et al., v. United States (Decisions on Objections to Jurisdiction, 20 July 2006) For example, "In the case Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands) (1959 ICJ Rep. 209), the ICJ [International Court of Justice fully] accepted the possibility of acquiring title to territory by prescription." (Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International law: a dictionary, 2005, p. 242) Another official reliance on the principle of "prescription" took place in 1982 wherein Argentina "ceded sovereignty to Britain by extinctive prescription." There was no need to bring this to court, it is just a known reality in full accord with international law. Argentina failed to fulfill their part to maintain their claim when it had the opportunity. Therefore, it lost its "de jure" sovereign claim to govern and rule the Falkland Islands. (Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain versus the past in the South Atlantic, 1977, p . 42)
It is important to note that this loss did not require legal action or a court decree to make it final and permanent. All that is needed is a well documented history of the act of legal waiver, acquiescence or prescription to prove it. (Ibid.) In other words, the proof is self-evident, apparent and obvious. This is important to the loss of "de jure" sovereignty of kings and sovereign princes, or their heirs and successors, because no court will accept their claims for adjudication. But the principles themselves and the historical evidence, outside of court, proclaims the real truth.
Recognition in modern times of the ancient law of prescription sustains its validity and legitimacy, but the higher laws of what is just and right and true are, in our minds, far more important. A country that robs a king or sovereign prince of his "defacto" right to rule over his own territory by usurpation of any kind is obviously wrong. "Prescription" at least gives the plundered royal family the "right" to be recognized as royal forever as long as they continue to use their titles and arms and never given in or acquiesce.
Some further court cases include:
1. "Right of Passage over Indian Territory (1960)" Portugal claimed a right of passage for some villages it was said to have sovereignty over and which were surrounded by Indian territory. India, in this International Court of Justice case, lost by virtue of their "acquiescence" and Portugal's continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. (Randall Lesaffer, "Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription," The European Journal of International Law, vol. 16, no.1, 2005, p. 53)
2. "Kasikili/Sedudu (1999)" Even though "the ICJ . . . agreed that prescription was a rule of international law,” Namibia failed to prove it actually occurred. (Ibid., p. 56)
3. "Sovereignty over Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipadan (2002)" In a case of Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Court recognized the peaceful (undisturbed by protest) and continuous display of State authority by Indonesia; such that, all Dutch "de jure" claims were dismissed as empty and invalid. (Ibid., pp. 54-55)
"Prescription had been invoked as a mode of transferring sovereignty over territory long before the 18th century." (Ibid., p. 48) It has a long history from time immemorial. Prescription, and prescription by any other name (some have labeled it "positive occupation," is not the only way sovereignty is extinguished or forfeited. But it ". . . ranks among the five modes of acquiring [sovereign] territory in international law." (Ibid., p. 46) "It does not apply to terra nullius [or uninhabited land]." (Ibid.) That is the acquisition of sovereignty by "occupation." The principle of prescription, which includes acquiescence, and the principle of alienation are the most applicable to "de jure" sovereignty, the sovereignty of nonreigning monarchs, and their successors, either to extinguish their royal rights and privileges or to protect them as long as the family does not become extinct; and, as a minimum, continues to use their exalted titles and the arms of their monarchy in every generation thereafter. As hereditary rights can go on forever or endlessly, so can the right of being a true and authentic royal or noble be maintained as a permanent possession to the end of all time.
(9) Has "prescription" ever involved a whole complete nation in modern times?
Yes, in 1950, the kingdom of Tibet was invaded and illegally conquered by the People's Republic of China who usurped the rights of the whole priest/monarchy and committed untold atrocities against an innocent people. A government in exile, with His Holiness, the Dalai Lama as it's "de jure" head, was established in India. They are officially called the "Central Tibetan Administration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama" (CTA) and consist of about 100,000 people. They claim to be the rightful and legitimate government of Tibet.
When a foreign invader or local insurgents have occupied a state, its government may flee abroad and, provided the state of refuge agrees, operate as a government in exile [or monarchy in exile] with the same legal status as it [or he] had before. (Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, 2005, p. 25-26)
In other words, as stated by Stephen P. Kerr, this right is " implicit in international law." But, " There is nothing to force countries to recognize such governments in exile, as long as they are unable to exercise real control over all or part of the territory they claim to represent. . . ." (Joint Publications Research Service report, JPRS-NEA-89-005, 17 January 1989, United States: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, p. 12) “ However, recognition may be implied in the act by which a state gives its consent to the establishment of the seat of the exile government on its territory.” (Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2003, p. 290) Indian has given this recognition to the CTA. However, this implied recognition is external, not internal. The international community does not recognize or deal with internal sovereignty, which is where the most important or supreme and ultimate authority lies. This is neglected, but it is legal, rightful sovereignty that is fitting, ethically and morally right, fair, just, legitimate, authentic, lawful and true.
In fact, legal recognition has been given. "The State of Tibet still exists at this time as an independent legal entity with a legitimate government in exile in Dharamsala (India) to represent it." (Legal Opinion of the Law Firms Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering, 7 May 1986) (International Institute for Environment & Development, Environment & Urbanization, vol. 6, no. 1, April 1994, p. 76) As a result, in spite of tremendous pressure from the usurper China, the very existence of the CTA and its claims under "prescription" prevents the full and complete recognition of China as "de jure" sovereigns over the Tibet. This is because the Dalai Lama and the CTA have never acquised, never abdicated, never given up or given in.
However, like most "de jure" sovereigns today, the Dalai Lama, and the CTA, are not officially recognized. Nevertheless, the international law principle of "prescription" protects "de jure" sovereignty as legitimate and authentic. Therefore, even though the cause of the Dalai Lama is not officially recognized, it is respected and recognized as what is --- right and true.
In fact, . . . few [Western nations] do not have a monarch reigning either de jure or de facto. . . . Although they continue to elect Presidents [and] . . . maintain representational government [they] still have a monarch either recognized by the government, or by . . . [many of the] people at large, and though essentially powerless, these monarchs maintain a symbolic link between a nation and its heritage --- its most sacred, most ancient traditions. They also constitute a government-in-waiting. . . . (Tracy R. Twyman, " Monarchy: The Primordial Form of Government:" http://quintessentialpublications.com/twyman/?page_id=48)
As with other cases of disposed monarchs, no international court will accept such a case, as the claims of a government and/or monarch in exile, so it is sufficient for them under " prescription" to merely exist and use their titles to maintain the dispute. All the CTA must do is continue and never cease to exist, in name and purpose, to forever perpetuate its rightful claims. All a " de jure" king, and/or his successors, must do is use their titles and arms to perpetuate its dormant rights forever. These rights can last " ad infinitum" or be permanent and without end. Why?, because, " de jure sovereignty is supreme, unchallenged, legal authority." (The Rt. Hon. Chris Patten, CH, “ Sovereignty, democracy and constitutions:” http://dspace.anu.edu.au
/bitstream/1885/41595/2/chris-patten.pdf) That is, it is supreme or above all. If the rights are maintained, “ The absent sovereign remains the de jure government of the country [even though they are never officially recognized].” (Oppenheimer, “ Governments and Authorities in Exile,” American Journal of International Law, p. 571) (Hersch Lauterpacht, C. J. Greenwood, International Law Reports, p. 559) And this can last forever provided the protest continues down through the corridors of time by the sovereign's lawful successors. The point is, it is inviolable. It cannot be violated under these circumstances, which " . . . means that the occupying power may obtain de facto sovereignty [sovereignty 'in practice' or 'in fact'], but the ousted sovereign retains it de jure [that is, 'in principle' or in the original and immutable law]." (Karen Guttieri,“Making Might Right: The Legitimization of Occupation,” p. 13 : www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research
_citation/0/7/3/8/3/pages73837/p73837-13.php)
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, 1st Sovereign Prince of Beneventum (1754-1838) widely regarded as one of the most versatile and influential diplomats in European history, explained, " A sovereign whose state is under conquest (if he be a hereditary sovereign) does not cease to be sovereign, unless he has ceded his right or renounces it, nor does he lose [it] by the conquest . . . ." (Duc de Broglie, editor, Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, vol 2, 1932, p. 160) In other words, he holds all sovereignty --- the highest intangible incorporeal right to rule and govern whether he has possession of the territory or not, and unless he cedes or renounces his royal rights, he and his heirs hold them forever. Renunciation, of course, can take place at any time afterwards and can be implied by a failure to use the sovereign titles, or be implied by a failure to protest in some other effective manner.
The world must know, in no uncertain terms, that neither he, nor his successors, have ever abandoned their claim to the crown and royal rights of their ancestors. Otherwise, lack of concrete evidence could play a part in the forfeiture of all rights.
(10) Is there an example of the protective power of the principle of "prescription"?
It is important to understand that royal rights were not only destroyed by " prescription," but redeemed, established and maintained by it. In fact, “ dynastic sovereignty [which is supreme, is founded, upheld and] based on prescription.” (Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 61) Kings, and sovereign princes, claimed legitimacy or the full right and entitlement to rule their kingdoms or principalities. Conventionally, such a claim is called or defined by “ prescription.”
"Prescription" should be understood as a claim or title or right to something based on long [and rightfully unchallenged] use or enjoyment of it [the right to govern]. . . . Prescription was . . . another word for possession, proprietary right and, indeed, ownership [full and complete ownership thereof]: a lawful title of possession of a territory, a right to control its affairs, and, to that end, to command its population [which is a fundamental component of sovereignty]. . . . (Ibid., p. 62)
"Dynastic sovereignty, resting on prescription. . . ." provided a firm and solid foundation for monarchy or any kind of government. (Ibid., p. 64) Prince Talleyrand, explained:
A lawful government . . . is always one whose existence, form and mode of action, has been consolidate and consecrated by a long succession of years. . . . The legitimacy of the sovereign power results from the ancient status of possession, just as, for private individuals, does the right of property. (Ibid., p. 65)
"Prescription," or rightful title to property and ownership by the king or sovereign prince, protected a nation from the horrors, terror and bloodshed that comes from anarchy and revolution. He espoused, ". . . prescription as the definitive [best or greatest] claim to sovereignty. . . . [In other words] prescription was conducive to peace [political stability and goodwill] and was in everybodies interests." (Ibid.)
. . . Prescription, is justly applicable . . . the constant and approved practice of nations shows that by whatever name it be called, the uninterrupted possession of territory or other property for a certain length of time by one State excludes the claim of every other in the same manner, as, by the law of nature and the municipal code of every civilized nation. . . . (Henry Wheaton & Alexander Charles Boyd, Elements of International Law, 1880, p. 120)
Again, it is important to understand that royal rights were not only destroyed by "prescription" as it supports established governments, but it is redeemed, established and maintained by it. In other words, ". . . 'Prescription' . . . was in practice the most important criteria [on earth] to legitimise the State, irrespective of its origins," and it still is an important legal doctrine of modern international law. (Joaquin Varela Suanzes, "Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine," Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, vol 6, no. 3, September 1999, #100) In fact, ". . . the concept of prescription (which legitimizes title through the passage of time) seems to be enjoying something of a revival in the post-Cold War Era." (Cherry Bradshaw, Bloody nations: moral dilemmas for nations, states and international relations, 2008, p. 54) In other words, it is increasingly recognized that "prescription" is a powerful ancient doctrine, which has earned worldwide respect and admiration for being just, equitable, and fair as well as being practical in not only solving property problems, but for sovereignty issues for territories and whole nations.
But, as explained in previous answers, it also destroys sovereignty, royal titles and privileges "ad infinitum." This is why "prescription" is so important, as a central issue, in determining true or false claims, especially in regard to those whose ancestors failed to maintain their rights after losing "defacto" rule. Emerich de Vattel tells us that "prescription:
. . . requires that every proprietor [ a "de jure," rightful or dispose sovereign], who for a long time and without any just reason neglects his right [to protest or use his or her titles and arms], should be presumed to have entirely renounced and abandoned it." (The Law of Nations, Book II, ch. XI, no. 141)
Vattel then explains, that, " This is what forms the absolute presumption (juris & de jure) of its abandonment. . . ." (Ibid.) " Juris" in this context means legally " conclusive" --- something that cannot be rebuttaled or refuted, and " de jure" means an absolute right, such that, " prescription" or abandonment creates a permanent and endless loss that cannot be renewed. Hence, it is critical that royal families not forfeit their rights by silence or implied waiver, renunciation or acquiescence.
Professor Ralph Ralston declared " prescription" is " well recognized in international law" ( The American Journal of International Law, vol. 4, no. 1, January 1910, p. 133) It is a " right of humanity." (Ibid., p. 137) And " the principle of prescription finds its foundation in the highest equity. . . ." (Ibid., p. 138) It punishes carelessness, lack of concern and negligence, and rewards effort, responsibility and good desires that are played out appropriately. " The principle of prescription rests on silence as an implication of consent, but there can be no implication of consent when dissent is explicit [that is, made obvious and undeniable]." (Alfred P. Rubin, " The Position of Tibet in International Law," The China Quarterly, no. 35, July - September 1968, p. 141) “ The absence of protest . . . forms a constituent element of --- estoppel or prescription. Like these two generally accepted legal principles, the far-reaching effect of the failure to protest is not a mere artificiality of the law. It is an essential requirement . . . a requirement even more important in the international than in other spheres. . . .” (Hersh Lauterpacht, International Law: General Works, 1977, p. 164)
The problem is when a deposed monarch does not use his or her titles, which becomes an act of silence, implied abandonment,acquiescence or absence of protest. "Acquiescence involves inaction by a State [or deposed monarch], that is, 'silence or absence of protest in circumstances which generally call for a positive reaction signifying an objection.'" (I. C. MacGibbon, "The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 31. 1954, p. 767) In other words, loss occurs through "A long-continued prescription or possession of sovereignty, without opposition or reluctation [or protest and such behavior], implies a full consent, and derives [or provides] a good title of inheritance [to the usurper], both before God and man." (Bramhall, "The Serpent-Salve," Works, III, 467. Cf. p. 318)
If such has taken place, certification or recognition is impossible. On the other hand, if they maintain their rights by using their titles, etc., and never fail throughout their generations to do so, then they can rightfully enjoy their royal prerogatives forever.
(11) If prescription, abandonment and implied abandonment are so important, why aren't they considered laws? They appear to be merely principles and as such have little or no power to do what a law would.
The International Law Commission of the United Nations has answered that. Concerning disputes of sovereignty:
. . . The subject has remained untouched by the codification movement. The reasons for that fact are perhaps not difficult to explain. The salient aspect of this part of international law lies in the rules relating to the original acquisition of territorial sovereignty by discovery, occupation, conquest and prescription. Rights and claims . . . have been traditionally regarded as synonymous with the most vital interest of States, and it is perhaps not surprising that there has been a reluctance to case the applicable rules of law in the form of codified principles which might be involved immediately, with some eagerness, by parties to pending disputes. This has been so throughout the last century [where] a number of territorial disputes; still unresolved have been pending and that the adoption of any rules would, in many cases run counter to the interests or views propounded by the parties to existing controversies. (Survey of International Law 1949, Chapter III: Jurisdiction of States, (5) The Territorial Domain of States, No. 64, pp. 38-39)
Attempts have often been made to establish rules as to usucapio and prescription in the case of the acquisition of sovereignty; but those rules merely state vague analogies. (Parliamentary Papers, Great Britain,1896, p. 12)
[Hence, sovereignty law] has remained almost entirely outside the efforts at codification. . . ." (op.cit., Survey of International Law)
One reason for this is the rights of sovereignty is too touchy and dangerous a subject which has resulted in terrible wars, ruin, waste and bloodshed; hence, the reluctance is reasonable and truly in the best interest of all parties.
[However] situations of great complexity going back into the distant past [when kings ruled] and affecting considerable territories can be solved by the application of legal rules. . . . These rules, while admitting of a pronounced measure of elasticity in their application, are clear in principle. (Ibid.)
In other words, the principles have been effective " as is" and they allow the greater flexibility needed to address complex situations. This flexibility goes very deep to the point " . . . that there is no hierarchy of sources in international law, and customary law and conventions may freely interact and influence, one another.” (Mark Eugen Villiger, Customary international law and treaties, 1985, p. 292-293) Why?, because “ . . . jus scriptum, namely codification, `freezes' or immobilizes law.” The results is a “ straight-jacket” of “ inflexibility.” (Ibid.) For this reason, flexibility is a governing principle, not exactness and precision in law. In fact, instead of attempting to use strict adherence to codified laws in all cases, as is typical of domestic courts, " . . . the liberty [is given to the International Court of Justice] to decide ex aequo et bono ("in justice and fairness"), granting the ICJ the freedom to make an equitable decision based on what is fair under the circumstances." ( http://en.wikipedia
(12) Are there no exceptions to the loss of de jure internal sovereignty through prescription?
Hugo Grotius gave a very important one. He wrote, ". . . in order that silence may establish the presumption of abandonment of ownership, two conditions are requisite, that the silence be that of one who acts with knowledge and of his own free will. For the failure to act on the part of one who does not know is without legal effect." (On the Law of War and Peace, Book I, chapter IV, number 5) Not only is free will essential, but if there has been ignorance through deception or undue influence, duress, threat or some other unlawful means, then the presumption of silence and abandonment is null and void. In other words:
Presumption of neglect cannot justly exist, where the original owner has, by ignorance of his rights, or by deception, or personal fear, been prevented from claiming what he is entitled to. If he knew not that he had a right, he could not be supposed to relinquish it. And if fear or fraud induced his neglect, his mind could not have voluntarily consented. (John Penford Thomas, A Treatise of Universal Jurisprudence, chapter II, no. 13, 1829, p. 34)
Hugo Grotius made it clear that," Contracts, or promises [in this case the promise of continued recognition as rulers] obtained by fraud, violence or undue fear [perpetrated by a government or some other unlawful force] entitle the injured party to full restitution." ( www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_217.htm)
Obviously, criminal acts do not create lawful rights. But where there is an absent of any valid or legitimate excuse, all rights are lost. Sovereign prerogatives can be destroyed through the legal and lawful principles of justice and fairness, which is why these principles are so critical to the future of nobility and royalty.
Justice also demands that, ". . . all men are to restore what they are possessed of, if another is proved to be the rightful owner." (Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book II, Chapter 10:1: www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_210.htm) This is why prescription protects lawful rights from ever dying, because justice does not condone theft or unfairness. The rights of sovereignty can continue forever if they are maintained in accordance with the principles of "prescription." The point is, ". . . The king does not forfeit the character of royalty merely by the loss of his kingdom. If he is unjustly despoiled of it by an usurper, or by rebels, he still preserves his rights. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter XII, no. 196) In other words, "The lawful monarch may be dethroned . . . [but] he continues to possess . . . the right of sovereignty [or rightful supremacy]." (Thomas Chalmers, Select Works, vol 5, 1855, p. 184) And this can last as long as their are rightful heirs and successors to continue it down through the ages.
That is, as long as there is a competent protest against a fraudulent government by a valid former ruler, even if it is hundreds or even thousands of years later, then the principle of "prescription" remains in full force and power. In other words, "the right of prescription cannot be extended [to support] freebooters ['someone who takes spoils or plunder (as in war)']. . . . [because sovereignty, the highest right of power on earth, once given has] inalienable, immutable rights." (Phillip Marshall Brown, "Sovereignty in Exile," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 35, no. 4, October 1941, p. 667) That is, rights that never end if maintained.
"But," as Emerich de Vattel declared, "if [a deposed monarchy or] the nation . . . does not resist the encroachments . . . if it makes no opposition to them,—if it preserves a profound silence, when it might and ought to speak,—its patient acquiescence becomes in length of time a tacit consent that legitimates the rights of the usurper." Nevertheless, ". . . It must be observed, that silence, in order to shew tacit consent, ought to be voluntary. If the inferior nation proves that violence and fear prevented its giving testimonies of its opposition, nothing can be concluded from its silence, which therefore gives no right to the usurper." (The Law of Nations, Book I, chapter XVI, no. 199) For example, "Nobody is ignorant how dangerous it commonly is for a weak state even to hint a claim to the possessions of a powerful monarch. In such a case, therefore, it is not easy to deduce from long silence a legal presumption of abandonment." (Ibid., Book II, chapter XI, no. 148)
It is also very evident that we cannot plead prescription [lost of sovereignty] in opposition to a proprietor [a deposed monarch or title holder] who being for the present unable to prosecute his right, confines himself to a notification, by any token whatever, sufficient [or strong and obvious enough] to show that it is not his intention to abandon it [that is, to give up any of his sovereign rights]. (Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter 11, no. 145)
This is where Vattel goes on to say that the use of one's royal and sovereign titles and arms is the usual and/or accepted way to make this solemn protest, and thus preserve and maintain the precious privileges fully and completely intact or without loss of any right.
(13) You have discussed the effect of “prescription” on sovereignty and royalty. Does “prescription” have any impact or influence on non-sovereign titles, such as, titles of nobility and nobility itself?
Yes, the right of nobility, like the right of royalty or sovereignty, are incorporeal herediaments --- intangible, hereditary property rights. They are owned or are the actual possessions or the “de jure” proprietary rights of an individual or family. Hence, the legal principles of “prescription” apply to them.
" Prescription" is " . . . in both domestic and international law, the effect of the lapse of time in creating and [or] destroying rights." ( www.britannica.com/EBchecked
/topic/475119/prescription) " Prescription" is gaining title or right to the " . . . property of another, (such as an easement) obtained by continued use over a long period of time. . . . The use has to be uncontested; if the property owner [the real noble family] objects to the use, “prescription” doesn’t apply." ( www.mmlc.ca/article-96d.asp) The consistent or constant use of the property, titles of nobility or claim, must be uncontested and the right of property exercised or used from time immemorial to rightfully claim legitimate ownership of the right.
Some of the ancient nobility " enjoy this [exalted noble status or] rank not by royal charter [or letters patent] but by uncontested exercise of the privileges of aristocracy." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/immemorail_nobility) That is, their right or entitlement of nobility comes completely from " prescription," that is, the uncontested " exercise of the privileges of aristocracy" for generations --- from time immemorial, which means from time beyond memory. In such a case, " Proof of unbroken possession or use of any nobility right since time immemorial [makes] it unnecessary to establish the original grant." (Ibid.)
If, on the other hand, an undocumented family claims noble titles and/or status and did not " exercise the privileges of aristorcracy" (use of titles is sometimes the only privilege left to exercise) from time immemorial, then all possibility to prove it was real and authentic is lost forever. Why? Simply, as stated, they failed to " exercise the privileges" from time immemorial and have no documentation to prove anything was genuine aside from it being a family belief. Family traditions often prove out to be family fairy tales or made up stories for which no proof or evidence of validity can be found or discovered. In such a case, no legitimate right can be claimed. (For more information, see “ Nobiliary Law and Succession”)
(14) Some experts believe that monarchs never could cede, sell or alienate their realms.
In truth, the greatest nations and the haughtiest rulers have engaged in such transactions; selling as the circumstances suited them outlying provinces of their vast estates. England, France, Germany, Russia furnish instances of this kind of traffic. A King of England sold Dunkerque to France. Napoleon sold the Mississippi valley to America. Most of the mediatised princes of Germany sold their sovereign rights for money. During the Caliph's own reign Russia has sold her great province of Alaska to the United States. Denmark has sold her duchy of Lauenburg to the King of Prussia. France has recently bought up the sovereignty in Monaco. Not many years ago the] Prince of Mingrelia sold his sovereign rights to Russia for a pension, [and more recently the Elector of Hesse-Cassel sold such remnants of his] --- rights as had survived defeat to Germany. No one denies that such transfers of authority are legitimate, if they are carried out with due regard to all existing rights. In India we have bought up sovereignty after sovereignty. Not long since the King of Holland was on the point of vending Luxemburg to France. (John Nichols, The Gentleman's Magazine, vol. 240, January - June 1876, p. 176)
The conclusion here is that, ". . . International Code specifically provides . . . that sovereignty may be bought and sold. . . .'" (Oscar William Coursey, The Philippines and Filipinos, 1914, p. 101) Of course, the likelihood of this happening today is, obviously, extremely low, but not impossible as we shall see. The buying and selling of whole sovereign principalities in totum after the Empire collapsed and ceased to exist is particularly germaine. The reason why this distinction is important is shown by the following two quotes:
1. The French ambassador to the Imperial Reichstag in July of 1806 issued a note stating that each state was thus a full and independent nation of Europe. He stated emphatically that Napoleon as Emperor and King recognized " the complete and absolute sovereignty of each of the princes [and the idea of] . . . maintaining with them the same relations as with the other independent [sovereign nations or] powers of Europe." ( http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/516)( http://personal.ashland
.edu/~jmoser1/dissolution.htm)
2. " The dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire meant that anyone who was previously a direct vassal of the Emperor without any intermediary (in other words, was unmittelbar or 'immediate') became ipso facto [by that very fact] sovereign. [In other words, they] ceased to be subject to any superior authority." ( www.heraldica.org
However, even before 1806, "In 1230 Frederick II (1215-50) conceded to each German prince sovereign rights in his own territory. From the thirteenth to the nineteenth century these princes ruled their territories as independent states, leaving the office of emperor a hollow title." (Mark A. Kishlansky, Patrick Geary & Patricia O'Brien, A Brief History of Western Civilization: the Unfinished Legacy, vol. 1, 4th ed., 2004, p. 188) After the Treaty of Westphalian in 1648, the 300 or so principalities of the Holy Roman Empire became more fully legally recognized as sovereign. That is, "Each prince or king became an emperor in his own realm." (Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, 2002, p. 17) "Although technically still a part of the empire (which would last in name until 1806), these [German] principalities gained all the trappings of sovereign statehood." (Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 29) "The Treaty of Westphalia gave virtually all the small states in the heart of Europe sovereignty, thus formally rendering the Holy Roman Emperor politically impotent [similar to a committee chairman of some 300 plus independent little sovereign nations loosely connected together]. . . ." (Thorbjorn L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, Manchester University Press, 1992, p. 71)
Keep in mind that the following little " countries" that were ceded were independent sovereign European nations after 1806. They were separate entities from each other. For example, even though the Principality of Cammin was part of the Kingdom of Prussia, this little principality was considered to be a distinct and independent realm; such that, the King of Prussia, the owner and sovereign, was recognized as the actual monarch or princely ruler of this little nation. He held the title as " Fürst zu Cammin" or " Prince of Kammin" in English. He held all the rights to govern and control it. The grand royal arms of Prussia carried its symbol and the Kings of Prussia claimed to be the dukes, princes and counts of this and many other realms in " full property and sovereignty." ( http://eurulers.angelfire.com) ( http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titulatur_und
_Wappen_(Deutsche_Kaiser_nach_1873)
The following are just a few of the legal alienations, of whole and complete little European nations, that took place in the Congress or Treaty of Vienna in 1815:
ART. XV. His Majesty the King of Saxony renounces in perpetuity for himself and all his descendants and successors, in favour of his Majesty the King of Prussia, all his right and title to the provinces, districts, and territories, or parts of territories, of the kingdom of Saxony, hereafter named; and his Majesty the King of Prussia shall possess those countries in complete sovereignty and property, and shall unite them to his monarchy. (Thomas Curson Hansard, The parliamentary debates from the year 1803 to the present time, Volume 32, 1816, p. 79)
Note that the territories are called "countries," because they were recognized as true nations under the law.
ART. XVIII His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, wishing to give to the King of Prussia a fresh proof of his desire to remove every object of future discussion between their two courts, renounces for himself and his successors, his rights of sovereignty over the Margraviates of Upper and Lower Lusatia, which belonged to him as King, of Bohemia, as far as these rights concern the portion of these provinces placed under the dominion of his Majesty the King of Prussia, by virtue of the Treaty with his Majesty the King of Saxony, concluded at Vienna on, the 18th of May, 1813. (Ibid., p. 81)
Note that the King of Bohemia gave "his rights of sovereignty" over these little countries to the King of Prussia, who, by the way, he was not related to by blood.
ART. XXVII. His Majesty the King of Prussia cedes to his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, King of Hanover, to be possessed by his Majesty and his successors, in full property and sovereignty. . . . (Ibid., p. 86)
Note that the conveyance was "in full property and sovereignty." The were proprietary nations. The following is part of the Annex to the same Treaty in Act IV:
ART. II. His Majesty the King of Saxony renounces for ever, for himself, his heirs and successors, in favour of his Majesty the King of Prussia, all right and title to the provinces, districts, and portions of territory of the kingdom of Saxony, hereafter designated; and his Majesty the King of Prussia shall possess these countries in full sovereignty and property, and shall unite them to his monarchy. (Ibid., p. 141)
Note that the " designated" territories were again called " countries," that is, full nations, and they were given " in full sovereignty and property." Only " countries" or " nations" can have full sovereignty. This kind of legal recognition is what is called treaty law, which is a part of international law. They were examples of whole nations that were conveyed to completely new monarchs. With this fact in mind, no wonder the great diplomat Prince Talleyrand named a number of these little principalities and duchies in his writings and lumped them together with kingdoms calling them " countries" and " states" and declared that they were " sovereign." (op.cit., Memoirs, pp. 161, 169)
Jean J. Burlamaqui (1694–1748), one of the founders of international law, explained that, " they [patrimonial kings and princes] are permitted to share, transfer, or alienate [their sovereignty] . . . [In other words, a] prince shall have full right [and prerogative] to dispose of the crown [his kingdom or principality], as he shall think proper." ( www.constitution.org/burla/burla_2107.htm) Alienation of this kind is highly unlikely in modern times, however, as Professor Stephen Kerr wrote, “ It is competent under the traditional doctrines of public international law to alienate Sovereignty by inter-vivos transfer.” (See Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (1625) Book II, Chapter VI, Nos. 3 and 14; and Book I, Chapter III, No. 12) (See: “ Dynastic Law”)
Because giving away a whole kingdom was the right of a true king, Henry IV of Germany (1050-1106) about 1080 AD before he became emperor, told some of the leading princes of the Holy Roman Empire, who he had wronged, that he ". . . would willingly cede his right of governance to them and dispose of his whole kingdom . . . ," the kingdom of Italy, if necessary to make it up. ( http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington
/ChurchHistory220/TopicFive/ChronicleHersfeld.html) However, he weaseled his way out of the agreement and held on to the kingdom for thirteen more years. The important point here is, that he could have ceded the whole kingdom, not whether he actually did it or not.
Ceding by treaties are often where kingdoms are conveyed from one sovereign to the new owner. Treaties are rich with examples of the alienation of kingdoms to new sovereigns. For example, in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the following took place:
His Catholic Majesty [the king of Spain] also agrees, in response to the petitions of Her Britannic Majesty to cede the Kingdom of Sicily to His Royal Highness Victor Amadeo the duke of Savoy, with Her Britannic Majesty promising that in the absence of male heirs of the house of Savoy she will take care to see that the kingdom returns to the crown of Spain, and Her Britannic Majesty also agrees that said kingdom may not be alienated, under any pretext or any other way, nor given to any other prince or state, but only to the Catholic king of Spain and to his heirs and successors. (Jon Cowans, editor, Early modern Spain: a documentary history, 2003, p. 208)
In 1718, Philip V, the King of Spain, by the Treaty of London ceded the Kingdom of Sardinia to Victor Amadeus II, duke of Savoy and King of Piedmont. He ceded the Kingdom of Sicily to Austria. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Sardinia) Many more examples exist throughout the years. However, perhaps, one of the best examples of a whole nations being ceded took place on January 14, 1814, " By the Treaty of Kiel, peace with Denmark is [was] concluded. Danish King Frederik cedes [ceded] to the king of Sweden, and his successors, the kingdom of Norway." ( www.islandnet.com/~kpolsson/swedhis/swed1800.htm) Here is an example, of an alienation of a whole country. For a little background, the Kingdom of Norway first began in 817 A.D. and lasted for hundreds of years on and off sharing other kings but remaining a separate and distinct as a land and people. In 1397, the three kingdoms were united under one king for awhile as follows and then only the kingdoms of Denmark and Norway shared the same king:
The Kalmar Union (1397-1536)
The United Kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden (1397-1523)
The United Kingdoms of Denmark and Norway (1523-1536)
In 1814, Frederik VI, king of both Denmark and Norway, as the rightful king of Norway renounced his rights and ceded the whole kingdom of Norway forever to King Charles XIII of Sweden and his descendants. King Charles XIII of Sweden, then separately became King Charles II to the people of Norway. This was done by Treaty of Kiel or by international law. In other words, it really is true, as the Austrian Emperor Francis II testified, “A prince can, if he wishes, cede . . . his country and all of his people [to another monarch or create a new kingdom or nation].” (Guglielmo Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe: Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815, 1941, p. 261)
The Kingdom of Sarawak was an “ independent kingdom,” which had its beginning in 1842 when the Sultan of Brunei “ . . . ceded the complete sovereignty of Sarawak to [James] Brooke,” who had saved his throne from rebellions. ( www.answers.com/topic/james-brooke) He became its first king and held the title of “ Raja [or king] of Sarawak.” In 1888, the second “ white Raja” accepted the British Empire as a military protectorate. ( http://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Sarawak) “ A protectorate, in international law, is autonomous territory that is protected diplomatically or militarily against third parties by a stronger state or entity. . . .” ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protectorate) A protectorate remains a full, complete and separate nation under international law; that is, it “ retains its sovereignty. . . .” ( www.infoplease.com/ce6/society/A0840302.html) In the treaty creating this protectorate, it was understood the Sarawak was an " . . . independent state under the protection of Great Britain;" and " such protection shall confer no right on his Majesty's government to interfere with the internal administration of that state. . . ." ( www.1911encyclopedia.org/Protectorate) Legal experts ". . . affirmed the fact that Sarawak was indeed an independent sovereign state and that no case existed for interference in the internal administration of that country." ( www.angelfire.com/journal/brooke2000/AnthonyStory.html) The United States and Great Britain officially recognized the Kingdom of Sarawak as an authentic sovereign state.
Sarawak “. . . grew into a genuine sovereign power over the region.” (http://coming
anarchy.com/2009/05/11/the-kingdom-of-sarawak-and-the-white-rajahs) The first white Raja “ . . . ruled as an absolute monarch with constitutional sympathies, perhaps akin in governance to the Tudor monarchy where a Parliament existed for advisory purposes only.” (Ibid.) Sarawak was managed very well by its kings who were “ efficient and orderly. . . . The rubber and oil industries boomed. Public service institutions grew stronger, complete with a penal code modeled on the British penal code, while local traditions were preserved and Christian missionaries outlawed.” In 1941, “ . . . a new constitution was adopted that turned the territory into a more genuine constitutional monarchy.” (Ibid.)
Sarawak was not a fly by night kingdom. It was not just a kingdom for a day. It was a kingdom for over one hundred years.
“After World War II, the third Brooke to rule Sarawak ceded the territory to the Colonial Office of the British Empire for a sizeable pension, paid to him and his three daughters.” (Ibid.) In other words, he sold his kingdom to Great Britain. His actions were objected to by the Raja Muda, or Crown Prince Anthony Brooke, which objection legally thwarted the cession, but after years of fighting, he gave up and renounced his "de jure" rights in 1951, so the transfer became fully and completely legitimated at that time.
Because monarchs could cede, alienate or dismember parts of their nations, some countries put it into their most sacred laws that such would never be allowed or permitted. For example, "Ferdinand IV King of Naples and III, King of Sicily . . . from 8 Dec 1816 reigned as King Ferdinand I of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. By Art 165 (III), Constitution of 1820/21, the King 'cannot alienate, cede, or renounce in any way to any other person the Royal Authority' and could only 'abdicate the throne in favour of the person of his immediate successor'" (www.chivalricorders.org/royalty/bourbon/twosicilies/bourbtsh.htm)
And last, by not least, one more transfer of all sovereignty " in totum." As reported in The New York Times for August 10, 1871:
. . . Thokambau, the leading chief, was by a meeting of the citizens of Levuka, proclaimed constitutional king of the Fijis. . . . The fact of the establishment of a new constitutional Government in the world may now be considered accomplished, and the 'kingdom of Fiji' will henceforth rank among the powers of the earth.” ( http://query.nytimes.com/mem
In other words, " . . . Fiji [was] "a State" with all the attributes of " internal sovereignty." (Charles St. Julian, The International Status of Fiji and the Political Rights, Liabilities, Duties and Privileges, 1872, p. 11) A new nation --- a kingdom had emerged. The Kingdom of Fiji was on the List of Sovereign States of the world for 1871 and every year thereafter until the King with his advisors and fellow chiefs ceded the kingdom to Great Britain in 1974. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_sovereign_states_in_1871) Seru Epenisa Cakobau, the senior warrior chief, became the king of the entire land in 1871. His title as king was " Tui Viti."
. . . He was recognised as king by the Western powers. In 1874, he was the lead signatory on the deed of cession which granted Britain sovereignty over the islands, and it was his efforts that brought Fiji under the guidance of the British Empire. After cession in 1874, all historical records refer to Seru Cakobau as only Vunivalu of Bau, or Ratu Seru Cakobau, indicating the title Tui Viti was lost when the sovereignty of Fiji was ceded to the British Crown. ( http://en.wikipedia.org
Interestingly, the Great Council of Chiefs still recognize Elizabeth II as "Tui Viti" or the traditional Queen of Fiji in spite of the fact that Fiji is now an independent republic since 1987.
Both law and practice confirms the words of Hugo Grotius, one of the founding fathers of international law, that, “ A free people, or a king, may alienate their territory, in part or in full.” ( On the Law of War and Peace, Book 2, ch. 6, no., sec. 7) In other words, “ A state may cede its own domain ["in totum"], in order to become a part of another state. . . .” (George Grafton Wilson, Handbook of international law, 1910, p. 85) The " cession" may " . . . come as a result of war, or cession by gift, sale, exchange or other international act. The treaty of cession usually prescribes the conditions under which the transfer is made. . . ." (Ibid., p. 84)
None of the above is a surprise to people who know history. For example:
§ 10. There are numerous examples of such treaties of sale. In 1301, Theodoric, Landgrave of Thuringia, sold the Marquisate of Lusatia to Burchard, Archbishop of Magdeburg, for six hundred marks of silver, --- "insuper cum ministerialibus, Vasalis et Mancipiis, et aliis hominibus cujuscunque conditionis in jam dicta terra commorantibus," etc. In the same manner, in 1311, Dantzic, Derschovia and Swiecae, were sold by the Margrave of Brandenbourg to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, for ten thousand marks. In 1333, the city and territory of Mechlin was transferred for one hundred thousand reals of gold, by a treaty of sale between its sovereign and the Earl of Flanders, the fealty being reserved. About the same time, the city and county of Lucques were sold by John of Luxemburg to Philip of Valois, for one hundred and eighty thousand florins; and a few years after, the sovereignty of Frankenstein was sold by the Duke of Silecia, for two thousand marks, to the king of Bohemia. The sovereignty which the Popes so long held over Avignon Avas purchased by Clement VI., for eighty thousand florins, from Jane, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 258-260; Dumont, Corps Lip., liv. 2, pp. 330, 364, 365; Dupuy, Droits de Boy F. C, p. 70; Leibnitz, Cod. Dip., p. 200; Biquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2.)
§ 11. The practice also extended to the mortgaging of sovereignties, and the sales of reversionary interests in kingdoms. Thus, Robert, duke of Normandy, in order to raise money to engage in the first crusade, mortgaged his dutchy for six thousand six hundred and sixty-fix pounds weight of silver, to his brother William, and transferred the possession before his departure for the holy land. In 1479, Louis XL bought the right of the house of Penthievre, the next male heirs in reversion, to Britanny. And fifteen years later, Charles VIII purchased, for an annual pension of four thousand three hundred ducats, an estate of five thousand, in lands in France or Italy, and the disposition of the Morea (when conquered,) of Paleologus, the nephew of Constantine, the last Christian emperor, his right to the whole empire of Constantinople. The act of sale being drawn up by two notaries, and ratified, Charles assumed the robes and ornaments of the imperial dignity, and made no scruples in claiming the imperial rights vested in him by virtue of this purchase. (Ward, Law ef Nations, vol. 2, pp. 260-262 ; Garnicr, Hist, de France, liv. 1, pp. 429, 461, 494; Russell, Hist Modern Europe, vol. 1, pp. 185, 472; White, Hist. of France, p. 208.)
§ 12. It was also the custom to dispose of sovereignties and dominions by deeds of gift, and by bequests. The emperor Lewis V., created the dauphin Humbert king, with the full privilege of disposing of his sovereignty at will, during life, or at his death. In 1343, Humbert ceded his dominions to Philip of Valois, by solemn deed of gift. By similar deeds, and upon a like principle, the emperor Henry VI. conferred upon Richard I, the kingdom of Aries, and the emperor Baldwin gave to the duke of Burgundy the kingdom of Thessalonia. By bequests, not only were whole sovereignties disposed of, but the orders of succession were frequently changed. Thus, Charles H., king of Sicily and count of Provence, changed by will the order of succession to the county, and the claims of Charles VHI to the throne of Naples were founded upon the adoption of Louis of Anjou, by Jane, queen of Naples, in 1380, which was evidenced to all Europe by a solemn and public deed. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 262-264; Leibnitz, Cod. Dip., pp. 51, 237, 158, 220, 382; Pfelfel, Droit Pub. d'AUemagne, tome 1, p. 541; Henault, Hist. Chron, tome 1, p. 315; Dumont, Corps Dip., tome 1, pp. 288, 337, 362.) (Henry Wager Halleck, International law: Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 1861, pp. 128-130)
In other words:
§ 7. A state may acquire property or domain in various ways ; its title may be acquired originally by mere occupancy, and confirmed by the presumption arising from the lapse of time; or by discovery and lawful possession; or by conquest, confirmed by treaty or tacit consent; or by grant, cession, purchase, or exchange; in fine, by any of the recognized modes by which private property is acquired by individuals. . . . (Wheaton, Mem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 4, §§ 1, 4, 5 ; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 221-277 ; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 4; Vattd, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, chs. 7 and 11; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 1, ch. 3; b. 2, ch. 9; Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. 4, chs. 4, 5, 6; Moser, Versuch, etc., b. 5, cap. 9; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 35, et seq.; Schmaltz, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 1; Kluber, Droit des Gens, §§ 125, 126; Heffter, Droit International, § 76; Ortolan Domaine International, §§ 53, et seq.; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. 28; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 4; Biquelme, Derecho, Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 5.) (Ibid., pp. 126-127)
(For hundreds of examples, see Edward Hertslet's book, The Map of Europe by Treaty showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes which have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814, three volumes, 1875)
(15) But I thought sovereignty was inalienable?
It is --- "sovereignty is indivisible, inalienable, and indefeasible” but only under certain circumstances. (Alain de Benoist, “The Modern Concept of Sovereignty:” www.scribd.com/doc/3323779/The-Modern-Conception-of-Sovereignty
-Alain-de-Benoist) A good question was proposed on the following author. He asked:
Is not the principle of inalienability itself a limitation on sovereignty [sovereignty being supreme and ultimate authority above all others]? Surely a sovereign who cannot alienate his sovereignty has his freedom of action [his highest of all powers] limited by that very fact? (Ali A. Mazrui, " Alienable Sovereignty in Rousseau: A Further Look," Ethics, vol. 77, no. 2, January 1967, p. 108)
A deeper understanding of sovereignty makes it clear that:
1. “indivisible” means it cannot be divided unless those in supreme power and authority, which is above all authority, freely and willingly without any coercion permit it to be segmented or partitioned;
2. “inalienable” means it cannot be alienate without the full and absolute consent of those who own all the rights to that sovereign power and influence, which is above all authority in the territory; and
3. “ indefeasible” means that the greatest power and honor of the nation cannot be annulled or made void by any outside authority of itself. But it can make up its own mind, with the supreme-supernal power it possesses to do whatever it wants to.
In other words, sovereignty can be divided, it can be alienated and it can be transferred and sold, if those, who hold this supreme right to control things, decide to do so. As Hugo Grotius declared, ". . . sovereignty can be alienated by the one under whose control it in reality is. . . ." (On the Law of Peace and War, Book II, chapter VI, no. 3)
Because sovereignty means that no outside force has a right to interfere or meddle, then, these inherent rights become inalienable, immutable, incorruptible and inviolable to everyone but the sovereign himself. What this really means is:
. . . that they may not be alienated from the person who possesses them, i.e., they may not be given or taken away [without his or her consent], i.e., they may not be morally infringed upon [by any outside force]. . . . For example, a man may violate your right to your property by taking it away from you, but your right to that property has not been alienated [you still hold the right], i.e., you are in the right and the robber is in the wrong. (http://www.capitalism.org/faq/rights.htm)
It needs to be remembers that monarchs own their right to rule. It is their property. Johann Wolfgang Textor (1749-1832), the famous German publicist and International lawyer, wrote, " . . . In an elective kingdom . . . the royal right is essentially the same, and therefore, an elective King is a true owner of his kingdom just as the King of a . . . [hereditary] non-patrimonial kingdom is." ( Synopsis of the Law of Nations, ch. XX, no. 24, 1680) And " . . . a non-patrimonial kingdom . . . is . . . in the position of the possessor [owner] of a majorit [which is a right to property by a title of honor, such as being king or prince]." (Ibid.) In other words, " . . . the possessor of a majorit is during his life is a true owner, and not merely a usufructuary [one that used someone else's property]. . . ." (Ibid.) So, " Sovereignty is a property which is absolute and indivisible . . . which belongs to the Sovereign. . . ." (Jacques Maritain, " The Concept of Sovereignty," The American Political Science Review, vol. 44, no. 2, June 1950, p. 349) No matter what kind of king or sovereign prince, sovereignty, once given, is owned. But above all others, in a true patrimonial kingdom, the monarch not only owns the right to rule or possesses full sovereignty, but he owns all the land as well. This is perhaps the highest type of king or sovereign monarch on earth. He truly personifies and embodies the nation in full property and sovereignty. Therefore, " Where the sovereignty is a full property right, it includes ownership of the land and the people, and the right to dispose of all at pleasure." (Charles Edward Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, 1900, p. 377) But for anyone who holds hereditary sovereignty, they ". . . had a right to supreme power which was natural and inalienable, inalienable to such a degree that dethroned [deposed] kings and their descendants kept this right forever. . . ." (Ibid., pp. 343-357)
Professor Textor rhetorically asked the question: "Whether a King can or can not alienate [sell or give away] his sovereignty [his royal rights] without his people's consent." He then explained, "Grotius says that he can in a patrimonial kingdom, because it is within the King's absolute discretion, but that he can not in a limited monarchy." (De jure belli ac pacis libri tres, Book II, chapter 6, no. 3+) In other words, a regnant patrimonial King or Prince can do so because ". . . he has full dominion and power of disposition" as the owner of all the land as well as being the Lord and reigning Monarch. (Ibid., p. 318)
This absolute power is similar to what a " de jure" non-reigning king or prince can do, which is the right to sell the " de jure" rights to one of his many little countries or even sell all the sovereign rights to his kingdom or even an empire. This was done by Andreas Palaiologos. " Andreas (Andrew) . . . was the only legitimate representative of the dynasty of the Palaeologi, who possessed the rights to the lost Byzantine throne." (A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453, Vol. 2, 1952, p. 590) This man was the " de jure" or rightful non-reigning successor to the Byzantine Empire. He legitimately sold all his " de jure" royal and imperial rights, titles and prerogatives, " which were genuine," to Charles VIII, the King of France, in 1494. (See the subchapters: " Ownership and Property Rights" and " The King and the Constitution as well as How Sovereignty can be Permanently Lost" in the article " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty") " Foncomagne has published the original draft of this act of cession which is in the Library of Paris. See Mem. de l'Acad. d. Inscript., XVII., 539-78 (Paris, 1751); DELAbOrDE, 405, gives a portrait of Charles, adorned with Imperial Insignia, out of the Coll. Gaignieres d. Bibl. Nat. t BUrCharDI Diarium, II., 226 seq.; Sanudo, Spediz., 192" (Dr. Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes: from the close of the Middle Ages, vol. 5, 1902, p. 461) Of course, this could not be done in our day and age, but back in those days, as Johann Wolfgang Textor testified, a " . . . [patrimonial] King can dispose of his Kingdom [the whole kingdom] and any part of it, in his own right. . . ." (Ibid., p. 81) So also can a " de jure" nonreigning monarch cede his or her royal and/or imperial rights. (See " Question 16")
There is another factor that must be considered in any alienation. A lawful heir can rightfully stop an alienation or cession from happening as he has a powerful birthright to rule after his father, However, if he consents, is acquiescence or silent, when he could and should have spoken up and protested, estoppel kicks in, then it is presumed that the right is abandoned on a permanent irretrievable basis. At this point, nothing can be done to reclaim it. It is lost. (See " Abdications, Renunciations and Annexations" in the article " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty")
But every land, title and sovereign realm is " inalienable," or impossible to divide, unless the reigning monarch, or in the case of a disposed " de jure" prince, this person willingly consents or decides to alienate it. The key here is one must give his willing consent, otherwise, such an alienation is impossible. Jean J. Burlamaqui explained that " the princes of the blood royal [in a hereditary realm] . . . certainly [have] an absolute and irrevocable [sovereign] right, of which they cannot be stripped without their consent." ( www.constitution.org/burla/burla_2204.htm) No one can lawfully " . . . acquire another man's property [or his royal rights and privileges] without his consent, for to deprive another against his will . . . runs counter to all Law.” (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 1680, p. 72) Prince Talleyrand wrote, " . . . A cession or renunciation is null, if it has not been freely made. . . ." (op.cit., Memoirs, p. 160) Hence, it is that sovereignty is inalienable unless the reigning king, or sovereign prince, or a rightful successor, willingly consents to an abdication, renounces the throne, cedes it or loses it by acquiescence, implied waiver, or estoppel, which in international law is a close cousin of acquiescence and prescription.
Jean Bodin (1530–1596), a renown French jurist and philosopher, declared that the French kings ". . . on their accession to the throne they took an oath never to alienate the domain." (Six Books of the Commonwealth, Book VI, ch. 2) Such an oath would not be necessary if it was not widely known and a common practice in medieval times that alienation, etc. was possible for a whole entire kingdom or principality, because such was done. Bodin explained, "This is not a rule peculiar to this kingdom [meaning France alone], but is a custom binding on the Kings of Spain, Poland, and England, for they also are required to take an oath against alienating the domain." (Ibid.) The point is, whole nations were, in fact, alienated, willed, discarded, sold and lost by the various means already explained, such as, those little "countries" that were ceded by the Treaty of Vienna.
However, there is another international legal term called " laches," which also impacts on either the loss or maintenance of " de jure" royal and imperial rights. " Laches is derived from the French 'lecher' and is nearly synonymous with negligence." ( www.lectlaw.com/def/l056.htm) It is used, " In addition, or as an alternative, to the principle of acquiescence, international tribunals have applied the doctrines of extinctive prescription and laches to bar a claim on the basis of undue delay." (Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell, Law and practice of investment treaties: standards of treatment , 2009, p. 525) " Undue delay" means a failure to make the proper protest to keep " de jure" rights alive, safe and faraway from the potential of permanent loss. Latches is similar to " statues of limitations" only it is not statutory, but part of equity law. It comes from the Latin expression vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit, which means " equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights." In other words, neglect to assert a claim makes one vulnerable to its loss. As in other principles of the transfer of sovereign rights from one state or sovereign to another, a defense from such can be insanity, infancy, undue influence, duress or a substantial threat to life, limb, family or financial ruin or disaster.
(16) Yes, it is obvious sovereignty can be sold, at least in olden times, but can a deposed sovereign or his successor sell his sovereignty? I believe the only example of such is Andreas Palaiologos, who sold all his "de jure" imperial rights to the Byzantine Empire to the King of France.
Note the following analogy and the conclusions of Dr. Stephen Kerr wrote:
Kept alive by diplomatic protests [according to the principles of prescription] made by King Francis II and the Count of Caserta, their claim . . . may be analogized [compared] . . . to the claim of the owner of a stolen automobile who has kept his claim of de jure ownership of that car 'alive' by filing a report with the competent police authorities: See Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. I, "Governments-in-Exile," pp. 921-930; F. E. Oppenheim, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," 36 American Journal of International Law (1942), pp. 568-595; and Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. I, No. 144.
That owner may not be in de facto possession of that automobile, but having filed the claim with the police he remains the de jure owner of that car. This 'claim' to the stolen automobile is not the mere 'expectation of a right.' Rather this 'claim' possesses real substance in the ownership of that stolen car --- given the filing of the necessary report with the police to keep that claim alive. Because this 'claim' to the stolen automobile has real substance in the basis of the police report asserting ownership to the car, this 'claim' can be sold or disposed of i.e., to an insurance company) as can any other 'claim'. For example, insurance companies will frequently pay off the claim of an owner of a stolen car and then assert ownership to the car once it has been recovered.
If the owner fails to make any claim whatsoever on the stolen car or any official complaint about it, the car's ownership can be legally transferred to the thief, the usurper, with the passing of time wherein a new title can be applied for. This also happens with sovereignty.
. . . Competent protests [under the principles of "prescription" are] not a mere "expectation of a right" but [are] a definite claim of real, concrete substance under public international law. As an international claim of real substance . . . the claim of the Bourbons of Naples to the Two Sicilies . . . is as renounceable and disposable as is any other claim under international public law. States frequently settle differences by renouncing various international claims against each other: See Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, Vol. I, Nos. 486 and 488. ("Interim up-date of Professor Kerr's 1973 Research --- Part 2:" http://web
.archive.orghttp://dynastic
-law.com/1973b.html)
Yes, "de jure" sovereignty is "renounceable and disposable." A true "de jure" sovereign, as a king, or sovereign prince, is theoretically totally free from all power outside himself and holding the supreme, ultimate power that cannot be interfered with, that is, such a ruler can sell, renounce, abandon, will, transfer or cede all he possesses to someone else. Prince Antony Brooke, the "de jure" king of Sarawak, renounced all rights to the kingdom in 1951, thus legitimizing his uncle's cession of the kingdom to Great Britain years earlier.
Andreas Palaiologos' sale of all his " de jure" imperial, royal and sovereign rights and titles to the King of France, Charles VIII in 1494 was an authentic and genuine conveyance. Two kings later, under Francis I, it was still being claimed that the kings of France were the emperors of Constantinople. Not until Charles IX, did the claim come to an end as a result of disinterest. (David Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State, p. 33) This disinterest was the equivalent of an abandonment.
Professor Noel Cox explained that, ". . . Time . . . erodes the de jure authority of an exile . . . through desuetude." (Letter of January 21, 2010) That is, if the "de jure" sovereign does nothing, which is "desuetude" --- doesn't even use his titles, it is like the man who fails to report his stolen car, which protest must be renewed with each new successor. If this claim does not take place, the car, the Imperial rights, can then become the legal, even rightful, property of the usurper --- the Ottoman Empire in this case. In other words, by "prescription:"
. . . [peaceful] possession [of defacto sovereignty] for time out of mind [time immemorial --- sometimes considered to be 40 years], uninterrupted and unchallenged, conveys absolute ownership. A right may thus be transferred from king to king or from people to people by dereliction [neglect] followed by assumption of possession, as well as by express consent. Even the rights of sovereignty may be so acquired. (Thomas A. Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, Volume 1, 1899, p. 296)
“ Sovereignty like anything else may be conveyed [lost or sold].” (Thomas A. Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 1899, p. 297) Or, it can be maintained without end as long as the royal house continues to exist. Sovereignty like any other true right is inalienable and inviolabe unless freely given up. Edmund Burke wrote, “ . . . the king does not lose his quality [his imperial royalty] merely by the lose of his kingdom. If he is stripped of it unjustly by an usurper, or by rebels, he preserves his rights. . . .” ( The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. 4, 2007, p. 332) That is, he, and his successors, continue to own their royal right to rule even if there is no kingdom to rule over, because these rights are inviolable --- a word that means by definition, indestructible. It cannot be destroyed by any outside force. They can only be surrendered by implied or overt abandonment via cessation, " prescription" or some other legal form of forfeit or abdication.
To keep the precious gift, rights, privileges, crowns, and honors of sovereignty, protests must be made, titles must be used, interest and desire must continue in every generation. (See " Question 7")
(17) What about Ecclesiastical sovereignty?
The sovereignty relevant to nobility and royalty, by definition, is exclusive to government or political power or "de jure" rights over a land or territory. Religious leaders do not rule over countries or nations. Their domain is religious and has nothing whatsoever to do with secular or political dominion. This is self-evident and obvious especially when it is considered that, "Sovereignty is the exclusive right to exercise, within a specific territory, the functions of a Nation-state and be answerable to no higher authority." (www.docstoc.com/docs/6414333
/National_sovereignty) In fact, "Everything and everybody, including the clergy, was subordinate to it." (Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 65)
Christian theology recognizes a division between government sovereignty and religious rights. “Over every nation he [God] set a ruler” --- a sovereign --- a secular ruler. (Ecclesiastics 17:14) That is, “By me [by the power and authority of God] kings reign, and princes decree justice. By me [that is, by God] princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth.” (Proverbs 8:15-16) These kings, princes and nobles had sovereignty and it was given them by God. The people, including the religious leaders, were subordinate to them in government rule. This division is important to remember in regard to religious claims to the right of sovereignty, because sovereignty, by definition and meaning, is the domain of the political or secular authorities, not the domain of ecclesiastical authorities, whose domain does not involve sovereignty. For example in the days of the Kings of Israel, there was a king, who ruled, fought and lead the military; and a separate man, the high priest and/or prophets, who was the religious leaders, who were uninvolved with war and had nothing to do with the warriors or what some would call "knights" --- David's special legendary elite, the "Thirty" or "the mighty ones." (1 Chronicles 11) That is, there was a division between sovereignty and religious leadership. Centuries later this division was still in force and it continues to this day. No wonder, the disciples of the Christ were taught to "Render . . . unto Caesar, the things which are Caesar's [that is, honor his right to rule] and [render] to God the things that are God's [the importance of living a good life]." (Matthew 22:21)
Church leaders were told that both they and the people should submit themselves “ to the king, as supreme . . . ,” that is, the one who is foremost and highest in rank politically. Therefore, Peter admonished his followers to “ Honour [that is, obey, give deference to] the [secular] king” --- he who held the right to rule and govern, which is sovereignty. (1 Peter 2:13,17) " For there is no power but of God: the powers that be [the kings and princes of the earth] are ordained of God." (Romans 13:1) Therefore, the apostle Paul also wrote, " Put them in mind to be subject to principalities [the sovereign rulers of these territories] and powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work." (Titus 3:1) (See: " Monarchy and Nobility: Divine Rights & Responsibilities") Hugo Grotius reasoned:
Christ himself, the spring, from whence all the power of the church was derived, and whose life is the model for the church to follow, said, his kingdom was not of this world, that is, was not of the same nature, with other kingdoms, otherwise, like the rest of sovereigns, he would have maintained his authority by the power of the sword. (On the Law of War and Peace, Book II, chapter XXII, no. 14)
The obvious conclusion, which is only common sense, is that there is a separate between church and state and "sovereignty . . . [is] a purely secular [political, civil or governmental] form of authority. . . ," not a religious one. (Robert Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, 2007, p. 62)
On the legal side of things, Noel Cox, LLB, LLM, Ph.D. professor of Constitutional Law, Auckland University of Technology and an expert jurist in this field, declared, “Supranational [international] organizations, unless [they] themselves [are] recognised as sovereign, cannot create Orders of Chivalry.” He also said, “. . . knighthood, as traditionally understood, can only be conferred by a Sovereign.” Hence, “Orders of Chivalry . . . [must be] under the protection of Chiefs or of Houses of recognised sovereign rank.” The conclusion is that, “Only de jure [legal] sovereigns . . . may create Orders of Chivalry.” Descendants who do not hold “de jure” sovereignty, have permanently lost the right to rule, and religious leaders, because they do not have the secular authority of a sovereign, cannot create a genuine “Orders of Chivalry.” (See: “The sovereign authority for the creation of Orders of Chivalry” www.geocities.com/noelcox/Creation.htm)
Professor Stephen Kerr concurred. He wrote:
To be legitimate, an order of chivalry must have a fons honorum: A sovereign house, a State, or other international person [who has the supreme right to rule politically or governmentally --- not a religious leader, whose has no such right]. Without such a sovereign fons honorum, the legitimacy of an order of chivalry lapses [that is, ends or terminates]. (See: " Dynastic Law")
Likewise, Guy Stair Sainty, a well-known expert in orders of chivalry, explained:
The Patriarchs [religious leaders] are not Sovereigns, or even claimants to Sovereignty, and therefore lack the authority to found or give their protection to Orders of Chivalry. . . . ( http://stichtingargus.nl/vrijmetselarij
(18) But what about the Pope?
The Pope is a recognized elective sovereign prince of a real independent country. It is probably the smallest nation on earth --- the Vatican. Prior to this, the Popes had sovereign territories and armies in Medieval times, and later after their loss were "de jure" sovereigns. Finally after the Lateran Treaty in 1929, they again had a real territory to rule over. All the orders of chivalry under the Pope are genuine and authentic because of this sovereignty. No other religious leaders on earth holds this secular right, which is the highest governmental honor one can receive on earth. The Pope is the only one who is a both a religious leader and a recognized monarch or sovereign prince over a little nation.
Pope Pius IX lost all territorial rule of the principality of Benevento, the dukedom of Pontecorvo and other important territories in Italy in 1870 and did not receive actual corporeal sovereignty again until 1929 via the Lateran Treaties, which made him the independent sovereign prince of Vatican City. However, during this time when the Popes were deposed having lost their princely and ducal territories, "by the terms of the Italian royal decree of May 13, 1871, the Pope is [was] guaranteed his sovereign rights and other immunities by Italy." (Henry Wager Halleck, Halleck’s International Law, 3rd ed., Sir Sherston Baker, ed., 1893, vol. 1, p. 119) In other words, this country acknowledged "as sovereign the ruler it dispossessed and granting him the same royal rights as the actual sovereign." (Salvatore Cortesi, My Thirty Years of Friendships, 1927, p. 213) This is just one example of how dethroned monarchs, and their successors, continue to be royal.
The Pope, since 1929, continues to be the sovereign prince of the tiniest nation on earth.
(19) Dynastic sovereignty is different from regular sovereignty or the sovereignty of today. So when you compare modern sovereignty with the sovereignty of monarchs, aren't you comparing apples with oranges?
Sovereignty is an extremely important concept. No wonder it has been described as " the defining doctrine," " the primary cause" from which flows all effective government, " the defining feature of statehood," " the glue or cement that holds all society together," " the one and only true stabilizing principle," " bedrock," " the foundation stone," " the most sacred of international law principles," " an indispensable concept," " of cardinal importance," " the central organizing principle," " the soul" of civilized society, " the reference point," " the central concept for the preservation of world peace," " the most basic principle in international affairs," " the dominant world order framework," doubtlessly " the most precious" of all governmental rights, " the cornerstone," " the guiding principle," " the key constitutional safeguard," " the final and ultimate matrix of a stable society," the " pinnacle," the " ark of the covenant," the " holy grail," the " Alpha and Omega," the " first principle," "the " sine qua non of international law," that is, the indispensable condition that cannot be done without, for it is " the building block," " the principle of solidarity" --- " safeguarding humanity." In fact, Everything of real importance in government revolves around this chief governing principle. (See: " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty")
A good definition is as follows, " Sovereignty is the quality of having supreme, independent authority over a territory." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty) This is describing " de jure internal sovereignty," not the external sovereignty that is the primary focus of international law. We use " Westphalian sovereignty," not just because it is the sovereignty created by the Emperor, Kings and Princes of the Holy Roman Empire including the Kings of Sweden, Denmark and others, but it is the sovereignty of deposed monarchs as well. Because:
The old (16th and 17th century) debates about sovereignty [which is Westphalian sovereignty] concerned principally with questions of internal sovereignty (e.g. who has de jure authority over whom within a political society, the limits of political [or internal] authority, etc.). (A. John Simmons, “On the Territorial Rights of States,” Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, Earnest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva, eds., 2001, p. 320)
As Professor Philip M. Nichols, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, taught, “This principle [of Westphalian sovereignty] retains its vitality [its basic fundamental importance] in international tribunals to this day.” (“Integrated Sovereignty,” 2008 Seminar Lecture: http://works.bepress.com/cgi
/viewcontent .cgi?article =1002
&context=philip_nichols)
Black's Law Dictionary describes sovereignty as:
. . . Supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power . . . , supreme political authority; the supreme will; . . . the self-sufficient source of political power from which all specific political powers are derived; . . . the power of regulating . . . internal affairs without foreign dictation . . . . (1430 (8th ed. 2004)
This is the definition we use as well. It is the same as the Westphalian Treaty was concerned about. And, as Professor Nichols explained, “ Local courts throughout the world [in modern times continue to] use the definition found in Black’s, or a similar absolutist definition [which is basically the same.” (Ibid.) But no matter how important this principle is and the fact that modern courts use it, a number of scholars use it as their favorite punching bag. (Ibid.) They use the word " absolute" and exaggerate it and make it unrealistic by overstating it boundaries, while neglecting the well-known fact that, “ . . . in the world no entity [no country, nation or kingdom] possesses absolute control over everything,” nor should it. (Ibid.) Sovereignty is a " right" not something always seen in action. It is like an iceberg --- only about 10% is above the waterline --- the rest is hidden or inactive. Sovereignty has always been limited in some way or another. It is an " . . . extremely relevant [and important] fact that sovereigns need not have supreme authority over all matters within a territory. . . . [In fact] in practice, modern sovereigns have never had total license or absolute authority over everything." (Jack Donnelly, "State Sovereignty and Human Rights:" http://mysite.du.edu/~jdonnell/papers/hrsov%20v4a.htm) " . . . There has never been a ‘mythical past’ in which states could exercise absolute control and authority." (Katherine L. Lynch, The Forces of Economic Globalization: Challenges to the Regime of International Commercial Arbitration, 2006, pp. p. 52-53) According to Grotius:
The supreme power is . . . limited by divine law, natural law and the law of nations, but also by such agreements as are made between ruler and ruled. Thus an indefinite number of rights may be subtracted from the authority of the ruler; his acts may be rendered subject to ratification by a senate or other body . . . yet the sovereignty still retains its essential quality unimpaired. (Charles Edward Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, 1900, pp. 375-376)
When the chips are down and an emergency appears, full sovereignty is there to employ as is needed and necessary. Otherwise its enormous power remains relatively invisible and unseen. People get confused when they forget that sovereignty is a "right," practiced in different ways. It is not to be "confused with [absolute] control over [all] outcomes. . . . Sovereignty is the right, not the ability, to determine one's policies. [In other words,] like any right it may or may not be effectively enjoyed [it might be] infringed, violated, or ignored." (op.cit., Jack Donnelly) It is important to remember that:
Sovereignty is not the Power, it is not the Authority, it is not the Command, but it is the Right of Power, the Right of Authority, the Right of Command, as Vattel so beautifully and correctly declares. Supreme Power, Supreme Authority, Supreme Command, is the superstructure, resting upon "that foundation and root," the Right of it, which is Sovereignty. (John Stephen Wright & John Holmes Agnew, Citizenship Sovereignty, 1883, p. 87)
Sovereignty is an abstract or intangible right, not a concrete fact. But it still has full power, when needed. The point here is, sovereignty is always there behind the scenes, it is intact, it is flexible, bendable and adaptable, but it is still absolute even though it is dormant and used in a divided fashion most of the time. So, “while this notion of [absolute] sovereignty has provoked criticism [because it is misunderstood], it [the concept of sovereignty] retains vitality in international use, and remains the cornerstone [or the fundamental and most seminal principle] of international law.” (op.cit., Nickols) It is indispensable to the nations and society, not only back then, but now. It's enemies would blame everything bad and wrong on it, but to any honest thinking person, "The concept of sovereignty cannot reasonably be blamed . . . for the world's horrors and imperfections." (Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, "Sovereignty: The Practioner's Perspective," Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities, Stephen Krasner , ed., 2001, p. 26) In fact, sovereignty ". . . continues to represent the most important vehicle available" in protecting freedom and individual liberty. (Ibid.)
Sovereignty is one of the most important concepts in existence. The right or privilege of Westphalian sovereignty is absolute and supreme. There are " . . . two dimensions of Westphalian sovereignty: internal and external. . . ." (Alena Ingvarsdottir, " The Fall of Westphalia? Sovereignty of States Post Globalization," 2009: http://skemman.is/handle
/1946/3088) " De jure" and " defacto" external sovereignty is the major focus of international law, whereas the " de jure" and " defacto" internal province is the sovereign domain of deposed monarchs and governments in exile. Sovereignty is a central fundamental principle, and it is " . . . is built upon an absolutist concept. . . ," in both ancient and modern times. (op.sit., Heller & Sofaer) A good summary of this law in terms of monarchy comprising of both the internal and external dimensions is as follows:
According to Laws of Nature and of Nature's God, no People have a right to change its Government, so long as it is well administered [is not oppressive]. Both Kings and Nobles have become possessed of legitimate rights, of which no People may dispossess them, until by misrule, unjust and illegal oppression, their vested rights shall have been forfeited. And other States, near or remote, have no right in any shape or manner to interfere. (John Stephen Wright & John Holmes Agnew, Citizenship Sovereignty, 1883, p. 180)
Independence and non-interference is external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is the right of the king or monarch, and his heirs, to rule and not be dispossessed unless they become tyrants and destroy freedom and oppress the people. Sovereignty must be bound up in good. Sovereignty is necessary to prevent anarchy, which is more destructive of freedom and prosperity, and brings more betrayal, terror and ruin than anything else on earth. A civil society requires a supreme and just authority to maintain it. Hence, ". . . Sovereignty . . . dominates international law." (Ibid.) It has for hundreds of years, and it has had dominion since the beginning of time.
In our day and age, " Courts [both local and international] continue to use the absolutist definition. . . ." (Ibid.) " . . . The absolutists conception of sovereignty dominates scholarly discourse" as well. (Ibid.) Because, no matter how it is criticized, no one can get away from its “ fundamental soundness.” (Ibid.) In other words, " . . . The Westphalian model and both of its dimensions (internal and external) are relevant and functional in . . . contemporary [times]." (op.cit., Ingvarsdottir) For it has withstood the test of time. It is the same sovereignty that was known to the kings and princes of old. It is the same today. There is no difference in the basic fundamental principle. (See: " Sovereignty in the Holy Roman and Byzantine Empires")
Emer Vattel expressed the fact that sovereignty is "the key-stone," "the vital breath" and "the very soul of [effective] government." (Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book II, chapter XX, number 30 and chapter IX, number 3)
With this "absolute" power, which is an "absolute" right, not continually "absolute" in actual practice, "A sovereign state can make a treaty. It can also break a treaty, or determine for itself when a treaty commitment is no longer binding or applicable." (Jeremy Rabkin, "Recalling the Case for Sovereignty" Chicago Journal of International Law, January 1 2005, p. 23) Thus the State can be protected from unwarranted or absurd agreements that end up being nonsense.
Even though, ". . . sovereigns have no superior," there is a difference between the raw absolute power of sovereignty itself and legal right to use it. (op.cit., Jackson, pp. 16-17) Internal domestic law creates checks and balances to ensure it is used for the common good of everyone. "Unlimited power is nowhere existent. Even in despotic countries there are influences of various kinds affecting sovereignty." (E. Asirivatham, Practical Theory, 1971, p. 349) In other words, that great and important power may and should be delegated or assigned out in a document of supreme law, such as, a constitution.
In practically all forms of monarchy, including constitutional monarchy, the ". . . monarch is the source of the Sovereign Power of the state and the grantor of any constitution, he is not deprived of the power conferred upon him by his kingship merely because he has promised to exercise it in a certain way. . . ." (Stephen Kerr, The Augustan XVIII:4, p. 130) In such a situation, the regnant king's powers are exercised by ministers, judges and other officials. But the king or sovereign prince remains the supreme power, holding all rights and powers in his person. That is, “. . . Each sovereign is omnipotent [all powerful] in the jural [or legal] universe [even if they are limited by a constitution]. (Quincy Wright, “National Sovereignty and Collective Security,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 186, The Attainment and Maintenance of World Peace, July 1936, p. 94)
Sovereignty being absolute, inviolate, and inseparable --- it cannot be divided, mutated or discarded unless it is done willingly by someone who holds the supreme right. Being inseparable, indivisible, etc., sovereignty is all or nothing in real practice and by construct. It reigns supreme as the highest principle of governmental power on earth. Quoting from the article " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty," " . . . Absolutes don't exist in degrees. You can't be partially pregnant, sort of dead, kind of human, or almost sovereign. These are not absolute conditions." One either has all the rights or none of them. Even " de jure" sovereigns have all of the following rights of royal rulers in their fullness:
1. Ius Imperrii is the right to command and legislate,
2. Ius Gladii is the right to enforce ones commands,
3. Ius Majestatis is the right to be honored, respected and protected as a sovereign person or monarch,
4. Ius Honorum is the right to honor and reward others.
Of course, the first two are dormant or inactive, but a deposed king or prince ". . . exercises the full plentitude [or fullness] of Sovereign Power, executive, legislative, and judicial," (op.cit., Augustan) because such:
. . . possesses[,] under the applicable doctrines of public international law[,] the implied constitutional power to perform all normal acts of state [as a government in exile], including those acts of state which would require the consent of an organ of government, such as a parliament, which is unavoidably suspended due to the exile condition. (Ibid. & "A Discussion by Prof. Kerr of the Original 1973 Analysis of the Disputed Bourbon-Two Sicilies Succession under the Doctrines of Public International Law:" http://dynastic-law.com/1973b.html)
Of course, such a "de jure" sovereign would not likely command armies, but such is still his or her dormant power. Rights are also limited and constrained by the country in which a "de jure" monarch-in-exile lives. That is, a "de jure" sovereign or government in exile must obey the domestic laws of the host country in which he or the government in exile dwells. Nevertheless, legal sovereignty of this kind is still supreme, valid and authentic and never ending. The point is:
The de jure sovereignty of a state [or monarchy] which has been usurped by a foreign [or domestic] conqueror is not extinguished by such usurpation but survives as long as such sovereignty is kept alive by competent diplomatic protests. (Philip Marshall Brown, " Sovereignty in Exile," American Journal of International Law, vol. 35,1941, pp. 666-668)
Thus, a royal or imperial monarch can rightfully use the exalted titles he holds, because he is a royal personage with all the rights, honors, privileges and majesty that goes with it. In fact, he must use those titles in order that no one would ever, at any time, get the idea that he has abandoned them, so no forfeiture of rights can ever be implied. Usurpers, foreign or domestic, are:
. . . obliged to restore the crown to the right owner, or to his heirs, till it can be presumed that they have renounced [or abandoned] their pretensions [their royal right to rule], and this is always presumed, when a considerable time is elapsed without their being willing [to use their titles] or able to make any effort to recover the crown [such as a diplomatic protest where possible].” (Jean J. Burlamaqui, The Principles of Political, vol. 2, part I, chapter, 3, no. 9) (For more information on this, please see " The King and the Constitution as well as How Sovereignty can be Permanently Lost" in the article " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty")
We are very grateful and pleased that most European "de jure" sovereigns continue to use their titles. They and their ancestors have never failed to follow what preserves and safeguards those sacred and special rights that maintain their glory and majesty. Thus the future of nobility and royalty is still strong as most known royals continue to be authentic, genuine, legitimate, valid, rightful and true. Thus, the future is bright for the survival of "de jure" or deposed kings, princes and their successors, even if such recognition is presently in an inactive or dormant state in international law. Again, in the words, of Dr. Stephen Kerr:
. . . de jure Sovereignty represents the moral principle that "might does not make right," it is [therefore] entitled to [full] recognition by other sovereigns [and all nations and all people] adhering to the moral [and ethical] principles implicit in International Law. ("King and Constitution in International Law," The Augustan, 18:4, 1977, p. 126: see: www.augustansociety
.org/products/r28)
In other words, ". . . a man may violate your right to your property by taking it away from you, but your right to that property has not been alienated [you still hold the right], i.e., you are in the right and the robber is in the wrong." (www.capitalism.org/faq/rights.htm)
" As things [stolen] are to be restored to their original owners, so subjects are to be restored to their former lawful sovereigns. (Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book III, chapter XVI, no. IV) That is, wherever there is an occupation of any kind, there must be a " . . . full intention of restoring the place to its lawful Sovereign. . . ." (Ibid., Book II, chapter II, no. X) It is unlikely that this will ever happen, but at least according to the rules of justice, fairness and " prescription," the deposed may be acknowledged as lawful, rightful and genuine forever as long as they continue to exist and continue to maintain their titles and arms. These principles are " implicit in International Law." op.cit., Kerr) " Implicit" means " implied though not directly expressed" or " inherent in the nature of something." ( http://wordnetweb.princeton
.edu/perl/webwn?s=implicit) In other words, the principles taught in this article are a fundamental integral part of the law. It represents what is right and true.
If something stolen cannot be restored, according to international law, just compensation would be, at least in this case, to give to the true deposed emperors, kings and sovereign princes, and their rightful successors, the status of being fully recognized sovereign persons in the glory and majesty of their " de jure" regal rights and prerogatives. (See: " The Legal & Moral Right to be Restored," in the article: " Sovereignty & The Future of Nobility and Royalty")
(20) Are there any court decrees that sustain the rights of deposed kings or recognize their "de jure" internal sovereignty as genuine and never ending?
Yes, for example, because of a number of judicial decisions in the last fifty years in Italy, a number of well-known jurists concluded that a ". . . prince, . . . [if he has not renounced, ceded or abandoned his sovereignty], conserves [maintains] the valid [legal] right to be able to exercise his power over the territory he was deprived of." (Professor E. Furno, with Professors E. Eula, F. Ugaro, G. A. Pensavalle De Cristofaro dell’Ingegno, "Questions being examined by the Magistry," Criminal Magazine, 1961) These men also concluded that, "The position of the dethroned sovereign at an international level still finds confirmations of considerable importance, being concrete and unequivocal [that is, they are not arguable, but are solid and binding]." (Ibid.) Validations include:
(1) "Reigning sovereigns . . . accept and respect the prerogatives [and royal rights of deposed monarchs],"
(2) States that have dispossessed their rightful kings, or sovereign princes, exile them and their heirs because they instinctively know that they have the inalienable right to rule their countries,
(3) If the ex-monarch wants to live in his own country, he must renounce his claims, all of which would be absurd if he had no authentic rights,
(4) If a deposed monarch is asked to return and assume the throne, there is always a legal act of agreement drawn up showing two distinct and equal claimants to the same sovereignty, and
(5) The dethroned monarch owns his heraldic identity. Neither the kingdom he reigned over or subsequent republic has a right to these identities. These rights represent his or her supreme title and prerogative to throne and country. (Ibid.)
In other words, the Italian magistry in the past has accept the authenticity of deposed monarchs and their successors. This has been sustained again in recent history. In recognition of this important truth, an international court of arbitration in Italy (also the Italian Supreme Court of Appeal) on May 9, 2003, decided that " for an unlimited period," that is, as long as there will be descendants who follow the law to keep their rights alive, that a rightful successor to the kingdom of [name redacted] and his heirs may enjoy the full right of title as the " Sovereign Head" of his house and former kingdom, and enjoy " all the qualities, prerogatives, attributes and styles of that rank and with the possibility to use coat of arms, titles and designations which belong to him by hereditary right." (Jacob W. F. Sundberg, Professor Emeritus of Law, " Regarding dethroned princely Houses and their legal rights," Stockholm, September 15, 2006: www.mocterranordica.org/Sund_Eng.pdf) In addition, such may use " the sovereign prerogatives known as jus majestatis and jus honorum, with the ability to confer nobiliary titles, with or without predicates, noble arms, honorific titles and chivalric distinctions relating to their hereditary dynastic Orders." (Ibid.) This is an extremely significant ruling that confirms everything we have taught in this thesis on royalty, nobility and sovereignty. The learned author then concluded:
As far as the head of a dethroned, formerly ruling princely house is concerned, in this particular case [which reflects on the status of all others in the same boat, that is, that this former ruling house] . . . has had its position as a subject of international law recognized, this should imply that the person concerned [and all others by implication] may on this account [because of this ruling] be considered as having rank equal to a head of state and such rights and obligations which go with it." (Ibid.)
The implication of this are extremely important and far-reaching. Legally making a rightful pretender to an ancient throne that no longer exists comparable to a current, reigning, royal head of state is extraordinary and amazing, but it fits perfectly with the law and the eternal and unending nature of hereditary rights, especially as they related to sovereignty. Dr. Stephen Kerr declared, " . . . Under the rules of the Congress of Vienna heads of former ruling houses are considered equal to heads of state." (" Interim up-date of Professor Kerr's 1973 Research --- Part 1:" http:///web/20050208083648
/dynastic-law.com/1973b.html) That is, the mediatized or dethroned princes and counts of Germany were considered royalty and equal to the ruling princes and counts of Europe. This international law principle is still effective today.
By virtue of an agreement made on June 10, 1958 by the United Nations, the decisions of this particular court in Italy are officially authoritative in over one hundred and twenty-five countries. And according to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, it is also valid in all the countries of the European Union. Hence, the judgment of this court pertaining to law is internationally powerful and binding throughout the entire earth. It confirms and validates the law of nations by making a nonreigning "de jure" sovereign prince equal to a reigning head of state. "De jure" princes, because they are the personification and embodiment of all government authority, are governments in exile. Truly they have profound and far-reaching, recognizable rights. For example:
. . . The Ordinary Tribunal of Ragusa of the 9th May 2003, in session as an international court of arbitration, in the case between the Higher Institute of Nobiliary Law vs. [name redacted], [declared the following rights were sustained for one house]: . . .
a) the quality of Royal Highness and Royal Prince of; . . .
b) the right to designate himself Sovereign and Head of Name and Arms of the Royal House of . . . never renounced, with the right for himself and his successors for an unlimited period, whether male or female, to all the qualities, prerogatives, attributes and styles of that rank and with the possibility to use coat of arms, titles and designations which belong to him by hereditary right;
c) the nobiliary style of Nobleman of the . . . and by the Grace of God and hereditary right as legitimate Pretender to the Thrones of . . . Sovereign Grand Master of the Military Order of, . . . Grand Master of, . . . Grand Master of, . . . Grand Master of; . . .
d) the sovereign prerogatives known as jus majestatis and jus honorum, with the ability to confer nobiliary titles, with or without predicates, noble arms, honorific titles and chivalric distinctions relating to the hereditary dynastic Orders; and
e) the quality of a subject of international law and of Grand Master of non-National Orders within the terms of the (Italian) Law of the 3rd March 1951, No. 178. (op.cit., Sundberg)
Deposed sovereignty is a recognized legal reality. Similar hearings in the past confirmed the same that the heir of an ancient sovereignty has the full and complete:
. . . right to ennoble, to grant and confirm coats of arms, to bestow titles drawn from places over which his ancestors had exercised their sovereign powers and also the right to found, re-establish, reform and exercise the Grand Magistry of the Orders of Chivalry conferred by his family, and recognizes him as a legitimate fons honorum. (Don Jan-Olov Malmberg, Real Aula Mallorquesa, Bulletin, Chemin de Notre Dame 2, ed., 2002, p. 20 and Dr. D.D. Breimer, The Legitimacy of Orders of St. John, 2006, pp. 296-297)
(21) But didn't some expert say the Italian Courts are unreliable and made bad decisions?
Yes, for example, Guy Stair Sainty, an expert in nobility and royalty, said that ". . . the Italian Courts have been persuaded to consider numerous claims to titles of nobility without actually applying nobiliary law, leading to some bizarre decisions." (www.chivalric
orders.org/royalty/royal.htm) As an example, the courts have contradicted each other:
In 1990, an appeals court in Milan, after hearing the evidence brought by the plaintiff, prince Pietro Donato Paleologo Mastrogiovanni di Bizanzio, confirmed his claim to be the heir of the Byzantine empire and convicted [Henri de Vigo Aleramico Lascaris Paleologo] of usurping the name Paleologo. ( www.maineworldnewsservice
An Italian Court had earlier declared Henri de Vigo Aleramico Lascaris Paleologo as the rightful heir. In fact, " Over half a century ago the famous Neapolitan clown, Toto, won court recognition as heir to the Sacred [Byzantine] Throne." (Ibid.) Another example is a sentence of 18-07-1945, no. 475, IV Section, of the regio Civil Tribunal of Naples, and 07-08-1946, no. 1138, IV Section, of the Tribunal of Naples of the Republic of Italy decreed that a fourth person, Antonio Focas Flavio Ducas Comneno, was " heir and successor to the various Byzantine dynasties of the Emperor Constantine the great." That is:
The Byzantine Emperors were successors and heirs of all the despotate rights, honors and titles of the Emperors who proceeded them. Therefore, there is no doubt that the claimant, being the only living heir and successor to the various Byzantine form Emperor Constantine the Great on, receives in his person, all the rights, honours and titles they enjoyed, and has the uncontested right to resume all the titles that their families held. (Ibid., Tribunal of Naples)
The problem with this is that these claims are clearly impossible. Not only was the Byzantine imperial title elective, but when a new family usurped a standing Emperor, succession laws gave to the usurper the full, total, and complete right of legal internal sovereignty and the former emperor, who lost, lost everything and had no " de jure" internal dynastic right to anything. Therefore, there was nothing left to pass on. He was completely and totally disenfranchised of any legal claim. Then, when the imperial title did become hereditary in the last 200 years of its 1000 year existence, all rights lawfully transferred to Andreas Palaiologos on 12 May 1465, who legally and lawfully sold all his imperial rights, titles, privileges, etc. to King Charles VIII of France in 1453. (See Question #16 and the article " Sovereignty in the Holy Roman and Byzantine Empires") So as Guy Stair Sainty said, the Italian Court obviously failed in this example to " . . . actually applying nobiliary law, [which lead] . . . to some bizarre [or patently wrong] decisions." (op.cit.) There was nothing wrong about the right of true successors to rights, title, and honors, but they failed to apply the rules of succession and the rules of " prescription," and therefore made some bad mistakes. This was most unfortunate as it leads people astray into believing things which are not true, accurate or factual.
One of the most important areas that they have failed to take into account violated not only well-known principles of what is considered fair and equitable, but universal, international beliefs about what is ethically and morally right. For example, the rules of "prescription" as explained in questions 6 through 12. Emerich de Vattel defined this important legal term long ago. He wrote:
Prescription is the exclusion [rejection, reputiation or elimination] of all pretensions [pretense] to a right — an exclusion founded on the length of time during which that right has been neglected: or, according to Wolf's definition, it is the loss of an inherent right by virtue of a presumed consent [or implied abandonment based on actions or inactions, such as, not using ones titles]. This definition, too, is just [and equitable] . . . it explains how a right may be forfeited by long neglect. . . . (The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter XI, no. 140)
The point is, when a court makes a decision, you don't know what evidence was presented and what was withheld or even hidden from them. For example, genealogy proof that is valid is extremely difficult, as it is not an exact science, because information is missing, and if a claim cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, it is invalid for the purpose of suppporting a claim to sovereign rights. Where genealogy experts in the court showing undeniable evidence of irrefutible descent, and that no other person or family had a superior claim? Was evidence made available that showed that all generations used their titles, so that the claims were never lost according to the rules of " prescription?" And if the court used the preponderance of evidence test (most Italian courts do for cases such as this), then all that was required for the decision was a 51% assurance after weighing the evidence on hand, which may have been inadequate. The problem is that this leaves as much as a 49% possibility, or practically a 50/50 chance, that their decision was not only wrong, but dead wrong.
Gunner Bramstan, a doctor of law and professor emeritus of the Universities of Uppsala and Lund, explained in reference to Italian courts, that if, “ . . . decisions are tainted by objectively established nullity; i.e. are affected by clear, grave and indisputable irregularities. . . ,” then the decisions are no longer legally binding. (Gunnar Bramstang, “ The independence of the courts and the validity of judgements vis-à-vis government and administrative agencies,” The Bulletin Real Aula Mallorquesa, 2010, p. 50) In other words, no matter what a court declares is true, if it is false, it is false. Court decrees that are patently wrong, are wrong and nothing can change that. Studies have pointed out that, [Courts in Europe often] come up with an assessment [a final judgment or decision] even if the evidence is patently incomplete," which would be considered judicial misconduct in the United States. ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1283503) The Italian court system more particularly than others suffers from this kind of misconduct where subjective rulings are made that are not based on an objective or solid proof. (See also: www.everyonegroup.com
/EveryOne/MainPage/Entries/2009/12/12_Can_
Anyone_Get_a_Fair_Trial_in_Italy.html)
Another problem is history, " In 1955, an expert on noble pedigrees, Enrique Carlos Count Zeininger de Borja, recalled in the Madrid journal "Hidalguía" a number of other instances in which courts had approved historically impossible claims." ( www.maineworldnewsservice
He noted that one of the big problems was ". . . there is no adversarial process and no hearing of the opinion of serious experts. . ." to establish the facts, but the courts were being used by contrived cases to validate impossible claims. (Ibid.) In other words, they were being set up to for the defendent to win and have no real evidence against the claim. He concluded that "Italian courts appear to excel in handing down such verdicts." (Ibid.)
These courts can be depended on to uphold the law or be legally correct and accurate as pertaining to ancient rights in general. But as pertaining to particular cases, they have been out in left field, not having all the evidence or basing their decisions on inaccurate assumptions or subjective opinions or suppositions. The only real legitimacy, of value and worth in this world, is the legitimacy of truth. All else is either dubious, or much worse, being a misrepresentation of what is true, and, therefore, promoting make-believe and impersonation of what is genuine and authentic.
These Courts were not wrong in declaring that the "de jure" or legal sovereignty of deposed monarchs is perpetual, unending and inalienable. They were only wrong in their conclusions about specific claims.
The real point here, and it is a big one, pertains exclusively to "de jure" internal sovereignty and royal prerogatives and rights. That is, that the full and complete right to rule can still be recognized and acknowledged, even though the loss of "defacto," real or actual control over a territory may have occurred thousands of years ago. In other words, the Italian courts upheld the law of nations as pertaining to hereditary "de jure" sovereignty; that is, that it is possible for it to last forever down throughout all generations to the end of time. In this, they were absolutely correct.
Other courts and scholars have also recognized the rights of the heirs to ancient thrones, a French Court of Appeals in the 1980's affirmed, validated and upheld the legality of "de jure" rights of governments in exile, which is the same kind of legal sovereignty that deposed monarchs hold. This court decreed, and this is important, that:
. . . a government in exile [which is "de jure" internal sovereignty --- the same thing as deposed monarchs hold] does not lose its rights to make appointments and to award Orders or commissions, to maintain its [legitimate] authority as far as can be done, and to pass on its legality under international law to successive heads-of-state." ( www.angelfire
.com/realm/StStanislas/PIRB.html)
Since this court also had international jurisdiction, it reflects general European legal opinion on the permanent continuance of rightful or "de jure" internal sovereignty, if kept alive and maintained, so it is never lost, forfeited or ruined by neglect, implied abandonment and estoppel. Dr. Stephen Kerr explained that:
History is filled with claims to sovereignty in international law being kept alive by diplomatic protests [by the rules of prescrition]: The Jacobite, Carlist (Spain), Miguelist (Portugal), Nationalist Free China in exile on Formosa, and the three Baltic Republics following the 1940 Soviet usurpation are examples. ("Interim Up-date of Prof. Kerr's 1973 Research --- Part 3," http:///web
/20050208083648/dynastic-law.com/1973b.html)
He further explained that " de jure" or former " . . . territorial States, kingdoms and principalities, as well as regnant [or reigning] princes, the pope, the United Nations, the International Red Cross, and the Order of Malta are [well-known to be] subjects of public international law." (See: " Dynastic Law") Hence, " a ["de jure" and/or reigning] prince is more than a private citizen. . . ." (Ibid.) " A prince possessing public law claims [such as, a deposed monarch] . . . is not a private person: In the contemplation of traditional public international law a prince is a person in public law and, himself, a subject of international law. (op.cit., " Interim . . . part 4") And " To this category of subjects of international law belong also dethroned sovereign princely Houses. . . as long as the princely House has not given up its claims. . . ." (C.A. Reuterskiöld, International Law, Particularly as Swedish Public International Law, 1896, 1927, p. 47)
Professor Emilio Furno, a former advocate in the Supreme Court of Appeal in Italy, also concurred. He wrote:
The holder of such prerogatives is a subject of international law [a public person] with all the logical consequences [or royal privileges] of that situation. That is to say, a deposed Sovereign may legitimately confer titles of nobility, with or without predicates, and the honorifics which pertain to his heraldic patrimony as head of his dynasty. ("The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders," Rivista Penale, No.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70)
As such, the Chief or Head of a Royal House is considered to be of a ". . . rank equal to a head of state." (op.cit., Gunnar Bramstang, p. 46) This status is the highest secular office known on earth, which explains such exalted prenominals as " His Majesty," " His Imperial HIghness," " His Royal Highenss" or " His Serene or Illustrious Highness," etc., because as Dr. Kerr declared, " . . . possession of a valid [authentic] claim [for a deposed monarch or successor] amounts to the same thing as 'dominion' [which by definition means the 'right' or privilege of lawful 'sovereign authority']." (op.cit., Interim) ( http://dictionary.reference.com/browse
/dominion) The point is, again, that deposed monarchs, and their successors, are perpetual sovereigns if they properly maintain these rights. Therefore, " The sovereigns of those kingdoms which ceased to exist . . . continue to exercise sovereign rights. . . .” (V. Powell-Smith, " The Criteria for Assessing the Validity of Orders of Chivalry" in Nobilitas, Malta, 1970) They continued, because they had the perfect right to do so. Why because in international law:
. . . [The sovereign rights] of a legitimate monarch was in principle [fundamentally] inalienable [or inseparable]. The only [way this could be changed] was through [the] freely given consent of the affected monarch." (Mikulas Fabry, " Succession and State Recognition in International Relations and Law," On the Way to Statehood: Secession and Globalization, Aleksandar Pavkoviæ & Peter Radan, eds., 2008, p. 54)
Monarchs held this exclusive right. It was absolute, indissoluble and indestructable. It is something unusual and supreme, but:
It is not the shape of a crown, or the value of its jewels, or the formal style attached to a name, or the size of a dominion [or no dominion as for a deposed monarch], or the large extent of political power, which constitutes sovereignty. (John Penford Thomas, A Treatise of Universal Jurisprudence, Book II, chapter x, no. 27, 1829, p. 301)
. . . He who [legitimately] exercises [the] imperial [or royal] prerogative, is a [true] sovereign, [and is] equal [or equivalent] to other kings, whatever may be his or their title. He enjoys regal [or by definition, majestic] dignity. (Ibid.)
In other words, " All sovereigns are equal, not of course in power, but in rank." (Mighell vs. Sultan of Johore, A Selection Of Cases on The English Law Of Contract, 1893, p. 377) For example, as stated in an article in America, the " . . . native Princes [of India] . . . claims to sovereignty were . . . equal to those of the reigning monarchs of Europe. . . ." (Conrod Swack Lamer, The United States Democratic Review, vol. 40, 1857, p. 407) Another example of this important reality is, " If the pope [or some other monarch] is sovereign, whether his state [is] . . . great or small, he is, as a prince, the equal of the emperor of the French or the emperor of Austria. . . ." (Orestes Augustus Brownson, The Works of Orestes A. Brownson: Politics, vol. 16, 1885, p. 559) Sovereign equality under the law was a part of the Treaty of Westphalia and is enshrined in the charter of the United Nations.
But not only are reigning sovereigns equal to each other, but dethroned monarchs are equal, identical and equivalent to the highest of all reigning monarchs by law. The Congress of Vienna, which reigned, from 1814 to 1815, made this distinction clear and unmistakable. It was established or set in cement that, " . . . the monarchs of the mediatised states [deposed princes] were to be considered equal . . . [or of the same royal or regal status and rank as] the remaining [regnant] sovereign monarchs. . . ." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Mediatisation) In other words, a " de jure," or disposed, sovereign is legally the equal of a current, reigning head of state. This was confirmed by the statement of three international legal experts as quoted in the last three answers. In other words, whether reigning or not, a monarch, or his lawful successor, is sovereign and therefore a royal dignity.
The exalted imperial and/or royal status of disinherited kings and sovereign princes, and their successors, are rarely recognized, but, as discussed above, it has been rightfully acknowledged in some courts, which have international authority. The legal significance of this is powerful and far reaching, but the concepts are not well-known or given much notice by the general public or by scholars. It is not politically correct or currently a popular practice to support the sovereignty of dethroned monarchs or legitimate governments in exile in this day and age. But as Dr. Kerr has stated, it is "implicit [implied, inherent, basic, intrinsic and fundamental] in international law" to uphold this important truth. ("King and Constitution in International Law," The Augustan, 18:4, 1977, p. 126) What is ethically and morally right is at the heart of all good and true law, and the law supports the genuine and authentic sovereign rights of the deposed kings and sovereign princes.
(22) What if a dethroned monarch, or a rightful successor, accepts citizenship in the republic that dispossessed him, doesn't this create an implied abandonment or acquiescence that destroys all royal rights or any claim to "de jure" sovereignty?
On the face of it, it looks like all is lost according to the rules of "prescription." That is, in the words of Emanuel Kant, a deposed monarch, who was not a tyrant or deserving, “. . . has suffered an injustice in being deprived of his throne and has a moral right to it (his "property"), provided he does not waive it.” (Peter Nicholson, “Kant on the Duty Never to Resist the Sovereign,” Ethics, vol. 86, no. 3, April 1976, p. 225) The question is, does he waive his royal rights to be a citizen of his former country? Kant believed that "if he [the deposed king or sovereign prince, or his successor] accepts citizens status he quits his claim to the throne. . . ." (Ibid.) So, this consideration is very important as many prominent claimants (true and rightful pretenders to ancient thrones) are now citizens of the republics of their former countries.
First of all, the ex-monarch, and lawful heirs, are exiles within their own countries whether they are citizens or not. They were and continued to be exiled from their rights --- their rightful place is as heads of state. They were unlawfully deprived, robbed and cheated out of this privilege. These unfulfilled rights were not given up by their lawful choice to live and dwell among the people they or their ancestors once ruled. This is recognized indirectly by a well honored treaty as well as common sense and the acknowledged principles of what is just and appropriate. The European Convention on Human Rights in Article 3 of Protocol 4 of 1963 stated unequivocally that: " No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the state of which he is a national." ( www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#P4.Art3) To require anything, such as a renunciation or the loss of " de jure" sovereignty for a former king, prince, or heir, to live as a citizen in the land of their forefathers, is counter to all law. International law recognizes " any agreement [whether abdication, renunciation or cession] signed under duress is void [or has no legal force, power or efficacy]." (Article 52 of the Vienna Conventions of the Law of Treaties) ( www.tibetjustice.org/reports/occupied.html) No one has the right to take away a person's private property against his will, especially if that property is inalienable and indefeasible; such as, the possession of " de jure" sovereignty of a deposed monarch or successor, unless it is done willingly either by abdication, cession or renunciation, or by neglect, disregard or implied abandonment. The point is, " Sovereign power . . . cannot be invalidated [or destroyed] by any other human power [but only by personal consent, not by force, threat or coercion]." (op.cit., John Penford Thomas, chapter II, no. 13, 1829, pp. 170-171)
This was made eminently clear in a February 2010 Italian Court. In spite of hearing the contention of HRH Duke Amadeo of Aosta, claimant to the united throne of Italy, " . . . that the prince [HRH Prince Victor Emmanuel, the son of King Umberto II] forfeited his right to the dynastic title because in order to be allowed to return to Italy from exile in 2002, Victor Emmanuel had to formally recognize the Italian republic as the country's legitimate government," the Court " ruled the Savoy royal title can now only be used by Prince Victor Emmanuel and his son, Prince Emmanuel Filiberto. . . ."
" . . . The claim to a long defunct royal line . . . was at stake [and the outcome was in favor of the son of the last king in spite of his Italian citizenship]." (Ibid.) This is a significant ruling, again, upholding the rights, the claims, the royal honors of former kingdoms. Being recognized as a court of arbitration in most nations, this ruling is binding all over the world and can be applied to the situation of all royal houses of dethroned monarchs. They have the lawful right to be citizens of nations, and not give up their rights to the throne, crown, glory and royal scepter of their ancestors.
Brief Review
" De jure external" and " defacto external" sovereignty, primarily the domain of international law, are not to be confused with " de jure internal sovereignty" --- the sovereignty of deposed monarchs and governments in exile. Otherwise, confusion results. (Please see Question #1 and Question #5)
The following review has been built on the idea that the former questions and answers have been read. If they have, then the reader will have a foundation to understand this section and see that the future of nobility and royalty is bright and glowing and will continue to be a benefit for many generations to come.
Sovereignty is "'supreme power, absolute, indivisible, and perpetual.' Thus it stands in all the text-books of the law of nations." (David Jayne Hill, "Europe's Heritage of Evil," Century Illustrated Magazine, vol. 94, 1917, p. 9)
. . . Sovereignty is captured in the original French where souverain implies simultaneously something above, superior, or supreme with respect to others of its kind in terms of rank; and something that excels, surpasses, or is better than others of its kind in terms of worth. (Donald S. Lutz, Sovereignty, 2010: http://law.jrank.org/pages/19072/Sovereignty.html)
It is a transcendent honor to be a sovereign for "To be a sovereign is to exercise the highest authority that it is possible for man to obtain." (Henry Graham Crocker, U. S. Department of State, The Extend of the Marginal Sea, 1919, p. 195)
. . . When the people have once transferred the ruling power, they cannot licitly [legally or lawfully] revoke it at will. If they have set up a hereditary monarchy, they are obliged to leave the ruling authority with the monarch and his heirs . . . continuing through an indefinite number of generations. . . . Hence, a later generation can revoke the original grant of power only when the monarch violates some of the conditions expressly stated in the original compact, or when he has gravely abused his power to the serious injury of the people. (John A. Ryan & Francis Joseph Boland, Catholic Principles of Politics, rev. ed., 1940, p. 92)
But remember, ". . . an exiled monarch does not lose it [his sovereignty] when the cause of his exile is unjust, as, for instance, insurrection or usurpation." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, 1680, chapter XX, no. 18(4) In other words, ". . . the banished monarch . . . has retained them [his rights, his sovereignty, his royalty, his majesty in international law] because it is some unjust cause that has driven him into exile, such as insurrection, usurpation, or hostile force." (Ibid., no. 18(3) He, and his legitimate successors, continue to remain the rightful rulers.
. . . A man cannot acquire a sovereignty over a nation by bare seizure. . . . [Theft is] no more a lawful title to the sovereignty [of a nation] . . . than robbery is a lawful [and legitimate] manner of becoming rich. (Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, vol. 1, part 2, Chapter III, no. VII)
Stealing is a crime no matter if it is a nation or someone's automobile. Again:
A sovereign whose domains have been conquered (if he is an actual person, not merely a title) does not lose his sovereignty unless he cedes his right to the throne or abdicates, but loses only the actual possession through conquest and consequently preserves the right to do everything not implied by possession. (Guglielmo Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe, 1941, p. 140)
The question is asked, "Cannot the usurping government be legitimized at any time by the consent of the people? The answer of these writers is a decided negative.
According to Dr. Cronin, whose view may be taken as typical, "in the case of a monarchy or an aristocracy, the people are not the authority from whom consent is to be sought; and as long as the monarch or ruling aristocracy is in existence, it is on their authority and by their consent only that legitimation can be affected." (Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethic, vol.2, 1917, p. 533). . . .
The people have no right to legitimize the government of the usurper, since ruling authority is not in their hands. It rests with the deposed monarch. . . . In a hereditary monarchy, the right to rule remains with the royal descendant until he has lost it through the long process of prescription. Until that process is completed, the authority does not lie with the people, and cannot be conferred by them upon by the usurper. (op. cit., Ryan & Boland, pp. 93-94)
The rules of "Prescription" can and does preserve a deposed monarchy, that is, it can keep their lawful rights alive and well by following its just and equitable principles. "Prescription" is about "internal sovereignty" or the sovereignty of dethroned kings and princes and their successors and a "defacto" or usurping government that has taken rule away from the monarch or rightful internal government. It works because "prescription" requires "peaceful" and "undisturbed" defacto rule by the usurping power. But if it is continually interrupted by a dethroned monarch, or his rightful successors, by virtue of the continued use of their regal titles (which functions as the required protest to the usurpation) then “the prescriptive period would never be completed” or ever create a legal and legitimate loss of royal, imperial or princely sovereign rights. (op.cit., Textor, chapter IX, no. 25) In other words, if these rights are maintained and kept alive continually by the proper protest, the deposed will continue to be sovereigns endlessly as long as the royal family continues to exist on the earth with a designated heir or successor.
Prescription is a title to the ownership of property [and/or sovereignty] which arises out of long-continued and uncontested possession and overrides all earlier claims to the property [or the right to rule]. It makes it impossible, after the period required for prescription has elapsed, to revive old claims to [royalty or to] the property [involved]. (Edmund Burke, Selected Works of Edmund Burke, Vol. 4, E. J. Payne, ed., footnote 21 for chapter 4)
That is, ". . . sovereignty, like property, if once alienated, can never revert." (David Hoffman, Legal Outlines, vol. 1, 1829, p. 197) However:
In order for acquisitive prescription to occur, the possession of the acquiring state must be. . . peaceful [or undisturbed, which means] (acquiescence [that is, "silence or absence of protest in circumstances which generally call for a positive reaction signifying an objection"] by any state that has any title [of ownership]) [or there is no transfer of title]. (op. cit., Jessup worldwide Competition in International Law, "Bench Memorandum 2010," p. 12 and I. C. MacGibbon, "The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law," vol. 31, British Year Book of International Law, 1954, p. 143)
" Prescription," can only take place if there is " . . . implied acquiescence [which is to passively comply to the new regime without protest by] the dispossessed sovereign." (John O'Brien, International Law, 2001, p. 210) That is, sovereignty can only be lost when it is " certain" that it is " the King's [or his rightful heirs] intent to surrender and concede his right and power" through implied or overt abandonment, which could be by abdication, alienation, acquiescence, ceding of rights or renunciation thereof. (Ibid., Textor, chapter 10, no. 18) In other words, " . . . Sovereignty cannot be acquired by the simple act of conquest [whether by rebellion, referendum or war], nor be transferred to the conqueror [or usurpers], if the sovereign does not cede it willingly." (Guglielmo Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe, 1941, p. 140) If there are no " indications and inferences of consent to the surrender," a passive compliance and a failure to use one's titles, arms, or award honors in the name of the former monarchy, then the usurping government --- " the republic's quasi-possession [of sovereignty] . . . will be interrupted." (op.cit., Textor) Interrupted under the rules of " prescription" means it is protested and therefore it is a disturbed possession or unpeaceful. And if it is distrubed by such a consistent protest, the claim or right to " de jure" or lawful sovereignty never ends. It conitnues on as long as the protest continues. The consistent use of the exalted titles of monarchy, as a minimum protest in every generation, renewed with each new successor, means that " the prescriptive period would never be completed," never come to an end, but continue as long as the earth shall stand. (Ibid., chapter IX, no. 25) That is how the law works. It can safeguard original ownership rights on a never ending basis as long as it is maintained and renewed from generation to generation.
" . . . The oneness, the indivisibility and the inalienable nature of sovereignty have . . . stood the test of time [in 'international law']. (Eelco van Kleffens, Recueil Des Cours, Collected Courses, 1953, vol. 82, 1968, p. 86) Each dimension has an internal and external component. " . . . Internal sovereignty . . . means supremacy of all other authorities within that territory and population. [While] . . . external sovereignty [is] . . . not supremacy but independence of outside authorities." (Hedley Bull & Andrew Hurrell, The AnarchicalSociety: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd. ed., 2002, p. 8) The sovereignty of deposed kings is internal and never ending. These characteristics are:
(1) Oneness, which is "The jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory 'is necessarily exclusive and absolute.'" (op.cit., Kleffens & Chief of the Supreme Court Marshall in Exchange vs. McFadden 1812) That is the internal dimension. The sovereignty of kings. Externally, it is about sovereign independence from others.
(2) Sovereignty, as indivisible, means that there cannot be two masters. One entity holds all the rights of sovereignty even though it is administered by different entities through a check and balance system or through a usurper under the rules of "prescription." (Ibid.)
(3) ". . . Sovereignty is inalienable, not in the sense that it cannot be ceded (history is full of examples of cessions of sovereignty, as many peace treaties attest), but in the sense that a sovereign power which divests itself of its sovereignty, ipso facto ceases to be a sovereign." (Ibid., p. 87) "That a nation [or monarch holding all the powers of the nation] may voluntarily cede its sovereignty is frankly admitted, but it can cede it only to somebody or something actually existing, for to cede it to nothing and not to cede is one and the same thing." (Philemon Bliss, Of Sovereignty, 1884, p. 105) Inalienable means that no one can take the right from the one, who owns or possesses it, no matter whether they are regnant or deposed, without their willing consent --- which can be implied or indicated by neglect to make the proper protest.
It is, therefore, extremely important that the deposed monarchs, and their successors, do not alienate or give away their rights by a failure to use their titles or make the proper protest. If they maintain their rights, the rules of " prescription" uphold their imperial and royal prerogatives as sacred, inalienable and indefeasible as shown above many times over and over again in the answers to questions and in some important court findings as well. (See: " Question 7" for " prescription" & " Question 20" for court decrees) In other words, their rights can go on to the end of all time, because of hereditary succession, which means, if you were a monarch, " that your children and your children's children shall reign . . . forever." ( www.ushistory.org/PAINE
" Sovereignty is a property which is absolute and indivisible, . . . which belongs to the sovereign independently, . . . as a right in its own." (Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, 1998, p. 38) " [That is, it bears] . . . the imprint of the personal property [the possession] of the [sovereign] Prince [whether deposed or reigning as a regant king]. . . . [And it] derives its transmissibility by hereditary right in perpetuity." (op.cit., Furno, 1961) " Perpetuity" means the state of being perpetual and unending. It has the potential, even the likelihood of being endless, especially if collateral lines are permitted to be dynasts. Under this provision, it could stand forever and be without end.
The recognition in international law of dispossessed sovereignty is still " implicit" and fundamental. (op.cit., Stephen Kerr) It has not changed or been altered. It is still binding, but it is, in effect, mostly a broken promise, because of a strong prejudice against monarchy and current practices. Nevertheless, it is a most true, valid, recognized and authentic right supported by the principles of justice and both the ancient and modern laws of " prescription." In other words, " . . . a deposed Sovereign may legitimately confer titles of nobility, with or without predicates, and the honorifics which pertain to his heraldic patrimony as head of his dynasty." (op.cit., Furno, 1961) This is an unending perpetual right if maintained by the use of titles as a continual reminder. And valid courts of law have sustained, supported and upheld these legal realities. (See Questions #20 and #21)
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